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Since the rapid rise in organizational forms for business 
associations, academics and practitioners have sought to explain the 
choice of form rationale.  Each form contains its own set of default 
rules that inevitably get factored into this decision, including the 
extent to which each individual firm owner will be held personally 
liable for the collective debts and obligations of the firm.  
The significance of the differences in these default rules 
continues to be debated.  Many commentators have advanced 
theories, most notably those based on unlimited liability, profit-
sharing, and illiquidity, asserting that the partnership form provides 
effi ciency benefits that outweigh any costs.  In this article, the 
authors test these theories empirically by examining the choice of 
organizational form by New York law firms.  Although the evidence 
indicates a strong shift from the general partnership form to the 
limited liability partnership form, a significant number of New York 
law firms remain general partnerships.
The authors conclude that the prevailing theories based on 
unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquidity are insufficient and 
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posit that, in contrast to the beliefs of many commentators, the choice 
of form decision is quite complex.  It is dependent on a variety of 
factors, including the behavior of other similarly situated firms that 
the decision-makers consider competitors for prestige and clients.  
Nonetheless, it is apparent that unlimited liability is generally 
considered burdensome, and it is the authors’ prediction that, at 
some point in time, nearly all the firms in their sample will choose to 
file as limited liability partnerships.  The general partnership form, 
with its unlimited liability, will operate only as a penalty default that 
punishes parties who fail to sufficiently define their organization, 
forcing firm members to reveal relevant information to courts and 
interested third parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
The choice of organizational form for business and professional 
service firms has been of interest to lawyers and economists for 
years.  The law offers a menu of choices, including general 
partnerships (GPs), limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), 
limited liability companies (LLCs), and, of course, corporations.  
Each organizational form has its own set of default rules, governing 
everything from the distribution of profits to dissolution.  Within 
each business form, parties can alter most of the default rules 
governing the arrangement.
One of the most important of these default rules is the extent to 
which individual firm owners will be held personally liable for the 
collective debts and obligations of the firm.  GPs and corporations 
are considered polar opposites with respect to this default rule.  The 
corporate default rule is one of limited liability, meaning that, absent 
special circumstances, corporate shareholders are personally liable 
for corporate debts only up to the amount of their original investment 
in the corporation.1  General partners, by contrast, can be held 
personally liable for all unpaid partnership debts.2
1 The exceptions to the general rule of shareholder limited liability are that shareholders will 
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The significance of this difference in default rules, if any, has 
been hotly debated by legal academics for some time.3  In addition, 
both economists and legal scholars have debated the relative costs 
and benefits of limited liability, with some observers arguing that the 
owners’ personal liability for the firm’s debts provides efficiency 
benefits that outweigh any costs. 4
In addition to the rule of full personal liability, many other 
partnership default rules appear—at least at first glance—
unattractive.  For example, the GP default rules include:  the rule that 
profits and losses be split equally among the partners, the one 
partner/one vote rule, and the guarantee of a partner’s right to seek a 
buyout.5
Despite these seemingly unattractive defaults, several theories 
have emerged regarding the desirability of the partnership form.  
These theories can be divided into three broad categories: (1) theories 
based on profit-sharing; (2) theories based on the illiquid nature of a 
partnership interest; and (3) theories based on the unlimited liability 
of the GP form.  The first two categories of explanations apply to 
partnerships generally, whereas the third theory—unlimited 
liability—is a justification for the GP form, in particular.
be personally liable: (1) when the corporation is not properly formed, (2) for the amount of any unpaid 
capital contributions that they have committed to make, and (3) when the veil of limited liability is 
pierced.  JEFFREY BAUMAN, ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY (5th ed. 2003).
2 U.P.A §§ 13–15 (1914); R.U.P.A. §§ 304, 306 (1997).
3 Compare e.g., Meiners, Mofsky, & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 351, 364 (1979) (arguing that the difference in the limited liability default rule between 
corporations and GPs is insignificant, because the default rule can be altered through a variety of private 
mechanisms) with e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (arguing that .”the distinctive aspects of the publicly held 
corporation – delegation of management to a diverse group of agents and risk bearing by those who 
contribute capital – depend on an institution like limited liability”); Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation 
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) (arguing that the publicly held corporation 
could not exist without limited liability.)
4 See infra text accompanying notes___.
5 R.U.P.A. § 401(b) (1997) (default rule on profit and losses); R.U.P.A. § 401(f) (1997) 
(default rule on management responsibilities); R.U.P.A. § 29 (1997) (default rule on partner buyouts).  
These default rules can be circumvented or ameliorated in several ways.  First, and most obviously, the 
parties can opt for another organizational regime, such as the LLC or corporation.  Second, the default 
rules other than limited liability can be altered through a detailed partnership agreement.  Finally, the 
rule of unlimited liability can be ameliorated through contract and insurance.
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In contrast to the theories posed by economists and legal 
academics that assert the benefits of unlimited liability, practicing 
lawyers cite the high costs of unlimited liability and argue that, given 
recent innovations in organizational forms, no valid reasons exist for 
the formation of business or professional enterprises in the GP form.6
In fact, some legal advisors go so far as to assert that any lawyer who 
chooses to organize clients as a GP is committing malpractice. If the 
practitioners are right, one must then question why the GP form 
exists at all.
In the last fifteen years, all fifty states have passed laws that 
permit the formation of an LLP.7  To become an LLP, a general 
partnership need only file a form with the secretary of state, pay a 
nominal fee, and comply with a few other formalities.8  If the partners 
want, the old partnership agreement can continue to govern the newly 
formed LLP.  The major difference between the GP and the LLP is 
that, in the LLP, the partners are liable only for debts stemming from 
their own conduct, or the conduct of someone under their 
supervision.9
6
.  See, e.g., Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Seeking Shelter: Partnership Structure Is Called into 
Question as Liability Risk Rises, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at A1 (quoting Belverd Needles, former 
director of DePaul University’s School of Accounting as stating, “[w]ith such risks, the partnership may 
go the way of the dodo.”); Tom Alleman, To LLP Or Not To LLP: When Striking Out On Your Own, 
Know The Form Of Business Your Practice Will Take, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER Vol. 229, No. 47 
(September 5, 2003) at 3 (stating that “[f]or most small groups, there really are only two choices -
limited liability partnership or some form of corporation.”); Sandy Lovell, Few Firms Form Limited-
Liability Corporations Inertia And Fear Of Client Reaction Breed Reluctance, 163 N.J.L.J. 645
(February 12, 2001) (stating that forming a limited liability entity instead of a general partnership should 
be “a no-brainer”); Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners Need Not 
Apply, 51 BUS. LAW. 85, 87 (Nov. 1995) (urging law firms currently doing business in the GP form to 
switch to a limited liability entity) [hereinafter, Johnson, Limited Liability].
7 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001), at 15 (Aspen 2003) [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LIMITED 
LIABILITY].  Some states, including New York, California, Nevada and Oregon, offer LLP status only to 
professional firms.
8 See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney 1997).  In New York, a general 
partnership that renders professional services may become an LLP by filing a registration with the 
Secretary of State of New York, accompanied by a $200 filing fee.  § 121-1500 (a)–(c).
9 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LIMITED LIABILITY, supra note __, § 1.02.  States differ in the 
limitations on liability provided by LLP status.  Some states limit liability for all claims, whether rooted 
in contract or tort.  Id. at 2-17 (discussing the variations among state LLP statutes).  Others states limit 
liability for selected types of tort claims. Id.
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The creation of the LLP form allows a natural experiment of the 
theories advanced regarding the costs and benefits of the partnership 
form.  To test these theories, we collected data on the 147 law firms 
listed in Martindale-Hubble and NALP as having their primary office 
in New York City and more than twenty-five lawyers.10  Since 1994, 
all of these law firms have had a choice of whether to remain a GP or 
adopt LLP status.  Furthermore, we supplemented the empirical 
analysis with extensive interviews of three sets of individuals 
knowledgeable about and active in the debate regarding the choice of 
organizational form among New York law firms:  law firm partners, 
law firm consultants, and malpractice insurers.
If the profit-sharing or illiquidity theories of partnership fully 
explain the benefits of the partnership form, then all or nearly all of 
the firms in our sample should have opted for the LLP form, as it 
provides all of the same benefits of profit-sharing and lack of 
liquidity, without the costs of unlimited liability.  In contrast, if the 
theories asserting unlimited liability as the primary benefit of the 
partnership form are true, then a majority of firms should remain 
GPs, or the firms should break down regarding choice of 
organizational form on some observable criteria.
Contrary to our expectations, a sizeable number of firms—about 
thirteen percent—remain GPs.  Sixty-seven percent have become 
LLPs.11  This mix is puzzling.  Overall, our analysis shows no 
significant variation based on number of lawyers, number of offices, 
rate of firm growth, level of profits, the level of collegiality, or the 
level of information asymmetry between the firm and its clients.  
Furthermore, on the surface, the difference between these firms is 
minimal.  Each has a sophisticated practice, with sophisticated 
clients.  They each provide roughly the same “product,” namely, 
high-end legal services.
The movement of most firms to LLP status and the lack of a 
clear relationship between individual firm characteristics and choice 
of organizational form raise questions about the value of unlimited 
10 The sample also includes eight “foreign” firms whose main U.S. office is in New York.
11 The remaining firms are PCs or LLCs.  For reasons discussed in detail in Part III, we 
dropped the PCs and LLCs from the analysis.
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liability, at least as applied to law firms.  However, the fact that a 
sizeable number of firms remain GPs undermines the profit-sharing 
and illiquidity-based theories as the sole motivation for the 
partnership form as well.  Because unlimited liability is the only 
meaningful distinction between the GP and LLP, unless many 
sophisticated law firms suffer from extreme inertia, it must be 
unlimited liability, rather than profit-sharing or illiquidity, that at 
least some firms perceive as valuable.
In the end, we argue that law firms today increasingly view the 
unlimited liability associated with the GP form as burdensome and 
predict that, at some point in time, nearly all the firms in our sample 
will file as LLPs.  At the same time, however, the perceived benefits 
of unlimited liability are real to many law firm partners and the 
public assertions of many lawyers that the GP form provides no 
countervailing benefits to offset the costs of unlimited liability are 
patently inconsistent with the behavior of many large and prestigious 
New York law firms.  We conclude, instead, that the choice of 
organizational form is a complicated matter, dependant on a variety 
of factors, including the behavior of other similarly situated firms 
that the decision-makers consider competitors for prestige and 
clients.
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II reviews six theories 
traditionally advanced as rationales for the partnership form:  (1) 
insurance, (2) monitoring, (3) generating trust and collegiality, (4) 
quality signaling, (5) preventing grabbing and leaving, and (6) 
providing incentives to mentor.
Although there are reasons to approach many of the traditional 
theories of partnership form with skepticism, each yields a testable 
hypothesis that we examine in Part III.  Subject to the caveats 
discussed in Part III, our data do not support any of the partnership 
theories introduced in Part II.  To provide insight into the choice of 
organizational form among New York law firms, we discuss in Part 
IV our interviews with three sets of individuals knowledgeable about 
and active in that choice: law firm partners, law firm consultants, and 
law firm insurers.  In particular, our interview data indicate that 
unlimited liability is increasingly viewed as a burden to be avoided, 
but also suggest that, for many law firm partners, the benefits of 
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unlimited liability are real and are not necessarily outweighed by 
increasing liability fears.  Part V concludes that the choice of 
organizational form is more complicated than either academic 
researchers or practicing lawyers have recognized.
II. THEORIES OF PARTNERSHIP FORM
In this Part, we discuss six theories advanced by researchers to 
justify the partnership form.  Each of these theories is dependent on 
one of three characteristics associated with partnerships:  profit-
sharing, a characteristic of both GPs and LLPs; illiquidity, a 
characteristic of both GPs and LLPs; and unlimited liability, a 
characteristic of the GP, but not the LLP.
As we elaborate throughout this section, there are reasons to 
doubt the explanatory power of many of the traditional theories.  For 
example, contrary to the assumptions of many economists, profit-
sharing is not a unique characteristic of the partnership form and can 
be easily accomplished through an LLC or corporation, albeit with 
greater transaction costs in the case of the corporation.  In addition, 
illiquidity is a common characteristic of both LLCs and close 
corporations and, through the use of standard-form restrictions on 
resale, these investments can be made just as illiquid as the 
partnership interest.  Nonetheless, we test each of these theories of 
partnership form in the following Part III of this article.
A. Insurance
The insurance theory of partnership form is based on the 
perceived efficiency benefits of profit-sharing and is frequently 
invoked to explain the tendency of professionals to organize as 
partnerships.  The insurance theory starts by noting that professionals 
make a significant investment in human capital.12  Such investment is 
12 For formal articulations of the insurance argument, see Kevin Lang & Peter-John Gordon, 
Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence, 26 RAND. J. ECON. 614, 615-18 (1995) and 
Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships, 26 RAND J. ECON.
591, 594-97 (1995).
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hard to diversify and, hence, risky.  Furthermore, an insurance market 
for human capital does not exist because of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  Consider a lawyer who invests heavily to become a skilled 
bankruptcy attorney.  The return on the lawyer’s investment is linked 
to the demand for bankruptcy work.  If, for instance, there is a 
prolonged economic boom, the return on the lawyer’s investment is 
small.  The lawyer cannot mitigate this risk through insurance, 
because any insurer—fearing moral hazard on the part of the 
attorney—would feel uncomfortable writing a policy that paid out 
when an attorney’s business was slow.
The question becomes, then, how can the bankruptcy attorney 
insulate herself from risk.  According to some economists, she teams 
up and forms a partnership with other attorneys.  The partnership 
allows the attorney to share profits with attorneys in different areas.  
Through profit-sharing, the attorneys diversify their individual 
investments in human capital.  Moral hazard remains a problem, 
however, because one partner might shirk, knowing that she will still 
recoup income through the profit-sharing arrangement.  Nonetheless, 
economists argue that the partners in a professional firm are better 
able to monitor (and therefore control) moral hazard than outside 
insurers.
For the sake of analysis, we accept the premises of the insurance 
theory of partnership that profit-sharing is useful because it reduces 
the risk of human capital investment and partners are better than 
outside insurers at controlling moral hazard.  From these premises, 
however, the choice of partnership form does not inevitably follow.  
A corporation, LLC, or PC could all share profits in the same way as 
a partnership.  Although such profit-sharing arguably entails higher 
transaction costs in the corporate form, it is not clear that those costs 
outweigh the benefits of limited liability provided by the corporate 
form.
Nonetheless, as discussed in Part III of this article, an 
examination of New York law firms after the passage of the LLP 
statute allows at least a partial test of the insurance theory of 
partnership.  If the insurance theory fully explains the advantages 
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associated with the partnership form,13 then all or nearly all of the 
firms in our sample should be LLPs,14 because the LLP provides all 
of the insurance benefits associated with partnerships without the 
associated costs of unlimited liability inherent in the GP form.
B. Monitoring Fellow Partners
The monitoring theory of partnership takes two different forms, 
one based on profit-sharing and the other based on unlimited liability.
1. Profit-Sharing and Monitoring
In an early article on this subject, Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz proposed that employee-ownership and profit sharing are 
useful when it is hard to monitor each employee’s input in the 
production process.15  By, in effect, making each employee a residual 
claimant, the employee-owned firm with profit sharing induces 
monitoring of each employee by every other employee.16  The 
inability to monitor an individual employee’s input, Alchian and 
Demestz claim, is the reason why many professional firms are 
employee-owned partnerships.17
13 As an empirical matter, the observed break-down among New York firms allows us only to 
reject the illiquidity and profit-sharing theories as the sole rationale behind the choice of organizational 
form among New York law firms. However, as discussed infra notes __ and accompanying text, our 
interview data, combined with the fact that the partnership form does not provide unique profit-sharing 
or illiquidity benefits, cause us to doubt that the illiquidity or profit-sharing based theories of partnership 
are even a contributing factor, much less the sole factor, that explains the benefits of the partnership 
form.
14 Although, in theory, if the insurance explanation fully explains the choice of organizational 
form, all firms in our sample should be LLPs, we phrase the hypothesis as all or nearly all and—
without more—would not reject the insurance theory of partnership if we were to observe a few firms 
still clinging to the GP form.  This is because, in reality, there is always a possibility that inertia, lack of 
attention, or transactions costs prevent a handful of firms from adopting the ideal organizational form.
15 Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).  
16 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note  __, at 785-86.
17 Id. at 786.  Henry Hansmann argues that Alchian and Demsetz overstate the monitoring 
problem associated with professional work.  Hansmann points out that professional firms go to great 
lengths to figure out how much each partner adds to the final product by, for example, tracking billable 
hours.  In addition, Hansmann notes that most profit-sharing agreements reflect the individual 
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More recently, Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear argue that 
peer pressure can produce higher effort among a firm’s members.18
Because firm members are more likely to apply pressure on other 
firm members to perform when they empathize with those whose 
income they affect—i.e., the firm’s stakeholders—peer pressure is 
more likely to be an effective motivating device in firms in which 
profits are shared among similarly situated individuals.19
Accordingly, partnerships are more likely to produce higher peer 
pressure and induce higher effort levels than are firms that are not 
organized for profit-sharing.
As with the insurance theory of partnership, we accept the 
premise of the monitoring theory that profit-sharing is desirable for 
the sake of analysis.  Yet the choice of partnership form does not 
inevitably follow from this premise.  As widely discussed in the 
worker cooperative literature, the monitoring explanation is an 
argument in favor of employee-ownership rather than investor-
ownership of firms.20  Nonetheless an employee-owned firm does not 
have to be a partnership.  The close corporation and LLC are also 
typically employee-owned entities in which the residual claimants on 
profits are directly involved in management.
productivity of each partner.  HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 70–71 (Harvard 
1996).  See also, George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell To Tournaments? The Need For 
An Alternative Explanation Of Law Firm Structure And Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1697-98 (1998) 
(making a similar argument). Others, however, have challenged Hansmann on this point, arguing that 
monitoring the work-product of professional service providers such as lawyers is not as easy as 
Hansmann suggests.  See, e.g., David Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of 
Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1598–99 (1998).
18 Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 (4) J. POL. ECON.
801, 805 (1992) (noting that, although peer pressure guarantees higher effort level, it does not guarantee 
higher utility, as peer pressure itself is a cost borne by the firm’s members).
19 Id. at 816.
20 See Avner Ben-Ner, The Life Cycle of Worker-Owned Firms in Market Economies, 10 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 287, 293-94 (1988) (asserting that better monitoring will occur at worker-run 
firms); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, 
and Economic Democracy 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1762- 63 (1990)  (discussing, but rejecting, the argument 
that worker control and participation arise primarily to resolve the monitoring problem); Gregory Dow, 
GOVERNING THE FIRM: ECONOMIC THEORY AND WORKER CONTROL (Cambridge University Press, 
2003) (discussing evidence on the question of whether worker-run enterprises engage in better 
monitoring).
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Nonetheless, we test the profit-sharing based monitoring theory 
of partnership in Part III of this article.  If profit-sharing through the 
partnership form fully explains the benefits associated with 
partnership, then all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should 
have adopted LLP status, as it provides all of the profit-sharing 
benefits of the GP form without the associated costs of full personal 
liability.21
2. Unlimited Liability and Monitoring
Another version of the monitoring theory asserts that unlimited 
liability encourages monitoring of each partner by every other 
partner.22  In the event of another partner’s misstep, a partner does not 
want to be on the hook for any award in excess of the partnership’s 
assets and insurance coverage.  Accordingly, under this version of the 
monitoring theory, unlimited liability induces each partner to pay 
close attention to the activities of her fellow partners.  As a result, 
effort and care are maximized, resulting in a better product.
Because the ease and effectiveness of monitoring are likely to be 
a function of the number of offices (geographic dispersion), the 
number of lawyers (firm size), and the firm’s rate of growth, the 
monitoring hypothesis suggests that the regression results will reveal 
a statistically significant effect of the number of lawyers variable 
(LAWYERS), the number of offices variable (OFFICES), and the 
rate of growth variable (GROWTH) on the choice of organizational 
form.23  In addition, because the unlimited liability version of the 
21 See supra note __ and accompanying text (explaining this hypothesis in more detail).
22 Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV.
1707, 1728 (1998) (stating that, “unlimited liability, by substituting for reputational and financial 
capital, arguably provides an important assurance to clients that law firms will discipline shirking and 
other self-interested conduct of their members”).
23 Kandel & Lazear, supra note __, at 812–13 (demonstrating that both the effectiveness of and 
the incentive to engage in monitoring decrease with increases in firm size and geographic dispersion).  
We did not predict whether this effect should be positive or negative, because we were unsure of the 
direction in which size, geographic dispersion, and rate of growth should impact the choice of whether 
to become an LLP.  One might surmise that large firms, geographically dispersed firms, and quickly 
growing firms find it more difficult to monitor and, therefore, choose to remain a GP in order to induce 
each partner to monitor every other partner.  In this case, we would predict a negative relationship 
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monitoring theory asserts that partners of LLPs monitor the quality of 
the firm’s output less vigilantly than do partners of GPs, it suggests 
that LLPs provide an inferior legal product.  If this is the case, and if 
clients possess some knowledge about the quality of legal services 
provided by law firms, then law firms that are LLPs must either:  (1) 
charge less for the provision of legal services than would the same 
firm if it had remained a GP; or (2) charge the same amount, but lose 
clients to firms that price legal services in accordance with quality.
Accordingly, if the unlimited liability version of the monitoring 
theory is true, the empirical and interview data should reveal that 
either: (1) firms that opted for LLPs status were forced to reduce their 
billing rates, or (2) firms that opted for LLP status experienced less 
revenue growth (that is, firms that become an LLP experience 
significant, abnormal, decreases in profits per partner (PROFITS) 
that the firm would not have experienced if the firm had remained a 
GP).  In addition, if LLPs are actually producing an inferior legal 
product, then their risk of malpractice liability should be higher and, 
as a result, their insurance premiums should be higher than they 
would be if the firm had remained a GP.  As such, the interview data 
should reveal that law firms that are LLPs pay higher liability 
insurance premiums than if they had opted to remain a GP.
C. Generating Trust and Collegiality
A third theory of partnership form involves bonding and the 
creation of trust among partners.  A partner, the theory goes, signals 
trust in her fellow partners by agreeing to personal liability for their 
actions.  This trust creates a more congenial work environment, 
enhancing the quality of the product.
between each of LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH and the likelihood that a firm is an LLP.  
Alternatively, one might imagine that large firms, quickly growing firms, and geographically dispersed 
firms find it so difficult to monitor that remaining a GP in the hopes of inducing more monitoring is 
pointless.  In such a case, the LLP liability shield should be more attractive and such firms should be 
more likely to form LLPs.  Under this scenario, we would predict a positive relationship between each 
of LAWYERS, OFFICES, and GROWTH and the probability that the firm is an LLP.
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At first glance, the trust theory of partnership—because of its 
reliance on the unique unlimited liability characteristic of the GP 
form—seems a plausible explanation for the choice of GP form.  
However, as noted in the debate regarding the benefits of limited 
liability, the GP form is not the only mechanism for placing an 
owner’s personal wealth at stake in a business or professional 
enterprise.24
Nonetheless, we test the collegiality hypothesis in Part III of this 
article.  Because larger groups, more geographically dispersed 
groups, and quickly growing groups are typically considered less 
collegial than small, stable, closely-knit groups,25 the collegiality 
hypothesis suggests that the regression results will reveal a 
statistically significant effect of the number of lawyers variable, the 
number of offices variable, and the rate of growth variable on the 
choice of organizational form.
In addition, law firms that have multi-tiered partnership 
struc tures (TIER) are considered less collegial than those firms in 
which partners are treated equally.26  As a result, one might expect 
that firms with a multi-tiered partnership structure value collegiality 
less, and hence are less likely to remain a GP in an effort to maintain 
firm collegiality.  Therefore, the collegiality hypothesis suggests that 
24 For example, the partners could form a limited liability entity, but personally guarantee debts.  
They could also post personal bonds, or over-capitalize the corporation, rather than withdrawing funds 
in excess of that needed for working capital.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman. The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law. 110 YALE L. J. 387, 429-30 (2000); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited 
Liability In Context: Lessons From The French Origins Of The American Limited Partnership, 32 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 511, 546 (2003); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 103-04 (arguing that voluntary 
corporate creditors frequently require personal guarantees or use other mechanisms to alter the default 
rule of limited liability for shareholders).
25 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (demonstrating 
that co-ordination and the resolution of collective action problems are more difficult for larger groups); 
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing the 
role of extra-legal, collective norms in small, closely-knit groups); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, 
And Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 535-37 (2004) (discussing trust and co -operation).
26 See Elizabeth H. Gorman, Moving Away From “Up or Out”: Determinants of Permanent 
Employment in Law Firms, 33 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 637 (1999) (noting that, “in a collegial 
organization, . . . all are formally equal in status”) and at __ (finding that collegiality, as measured by 
firms’ narrative descriptions, is negatively associated with the presence of a two-tier partnership 
structure.); Peter D. Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital Structures and 
Organizational Capabilities, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 671, 677 (1995) (stating that, “tiers may 
damage the sense of collegiality and mutual monitoring that exists when partners are coequals”).
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the regression results will reveal a statistically significant positive 
effect of the TIER variable on the likelihood that a firm is an LLP.
Finally, some law firms publicize their congenial environment, 
whereas others do not.  If the collegiality theory of partnership is 
true, we should observe a statistically significant negative effect of 
the COLLEGIAL variable on the probability that a law firm chooses 
to become an LLP.27
D. Quality Signaling
The signaling theory of partnership takes two different forms, 
depending on the source of the signal.  In the initial formulation, 
firms signal quality by adopting unlimited liability.  In the more 
recent articulation, profit-sharing serves as the signal.  According to 
the quality signaling theory, the need for signaling arises whenever 
consumers are unable to assess the quality of a product.  As a result, 
they are reluctant to buy the product without some quality assurance.
1. Unlimited Liability and Signaling
One version of the quality signaling theory asserts that unlimited 
liability encourages each partner to take more care in the provision of 
goods and services in order to avoid losing personal assets.  In 
addition, as discussed in Part II.B.2, unlimited liability is thought to 
encourage monitoring of each partner by every other partner.  
Knowing these facts, consumers feel more comfortable about the 
quality of the product.  In other words, unlimited liability is thought 
to provide a credible signal of quality.
There are reasons to approach the quality signaling theory with 
skepticism.  Although unlimited liability might serve as a quality 
signal, it is not the only possible signal of quality.  For example, a 
firm can also signal quality by maintaining a good reputation, 
established through repeated interactions with consumers.  For 
27 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (describing this variable in more detail.)
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unlimited liability signaling to work, one must demonstrate that 
unlimited liability is the cheapest credible signal of quality.
Despite this skepticism, we test the unlimited liability version of 
the quality signaling theory in Part III of this article.  Because the 
quality signaling theory depends on information asymmetry between 
producers and consumers of products (in this case, legal services), we 
predict that firms whose clients possess less information regarding 
the quality of legal services they receive should have a greater need 
to engage in this type of quality signaling than firms whose clients 
are well-informed regarding the quality of legal services they 
purchase.  Because more sophisticated clients are more likely to 
possess such information and because clients in the Fortune 250 are 
more likely to be sophisticated than clients that are not, we predicted 
a significant, positive effect of the Fortune 250 variable (FORTUNE) 
on the probability that the firm is an LLP.28
In addition, because research shows that more sophisticated 
clients and clients with a higher number of in-house counsel are more 
informed about the quality of legal services provided by law firms,29
this version of the signaling hypothesis suggests that the logit model 
results will reveal a statistically significant positive effect of both the
average and the total number of in-house counsel (IN-HOUSE-AVG 
and IN-HOUSE-TOTAL) and the Fortune 250 variable (FORTUNE) 
on the probability that a firm is an LLP.30  Finally, if becoming an 
LLP really sends a negative signal to clients about the quality of legal 
services, then firms that become an LLP should either: (1) charge less 
for legal services than they otherwise could if the firm had remained 
a GP, or (2) see a significant, abnormal, negative change in profits-
28 Cf. John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1310 n. 40 (2001) (stating that, “[o]lder, larger, and more profitable companies are 
more likely to have better and larger in-house legal staffs more capable of monitoring outside firms”); 
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 
(1985) (discussing the important role of in-house counsel in monitoring and selecting outside counsel, 
especially at the largest American corporations).
29 ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW 
FIRM 59 (1988); Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate 
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 856 (1998).
30 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (describing these variables).
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per-partner (PROFITS) that the firm would not have experienced if it 
had remained a GP.
2. Profit-Sharing and Signaling
Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis advance a different signaling 
theory of partnership, focusing on profit-sharing.31  They start with 
the notion that an employee-owned firm engaged in profit-sharing is 
less inclined than a corporation to hire new workers.  In a profit-
sharing partnership, each partner cares about profits per partner, not 
total profits.  As a result, a new partner will not be welcomed into the 
firm unless her contribution to firm profits is greater than the profits 
produced by the average partner.  In contrast, because a corporation 
cares about total profits, it will bring in new workers if the marginal 
benefit of that worker is greater than their marginal cost to the firm.  
Because the partnership focuses on average profits rather than the 
marginal increase in profits, a profit-sharing partnership has an 
incentive to hire higher quality workers than the corporation.32
In markets where there are informational disparities, however, 
both the corporation and the partnership have an incentive to hire less 
able workers, hoping that the consumer will fail to notice the 
resulting loss in quality.  Levin and Tadelis conclude that the 
incentive to “cheat” on worker quality is mitigated in a partnership 
because of the partnership’s initial preference for higher quality 
workers.33  They argue that this explains why professional firms are 
more apt than other types of firms to organize as partnerships:  the 
market for professional services (for example, law, medicine, or 
31 Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis, Profit-Sharing and the Role of Professional 
Partnerships, Duke-UNC Micro-Theory Working Paper  1 (Nov. 2003) (“We take the defining feature of 
a partnership to be redistribution of profits among partners.”) .
32 Levin and Tadelis demonstrate that this is not always an optimal result.  If there is no 
asymmetric information in the market, the partnership operates inefficiently.  It hires workers of too high 
a quality and provides too high a quality of product.  Put another way, in the “full-information” market 
consumers prefer to pay less and receive a lower quality product than the profit-sharing partnership 
produces.
33 Id. at 2.
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accounting) contains large informational disparities, making the 
choice of the partnership form more profitable.34
As previously discussed in Parts II.A and B of this article, the 
partnership form is unnecessary to attain the benefits of profit-
sharing.  As a theoretical matter, we thus find it unlikely that any 
partnership theory based on profit-sharing, including signaling 
theories, can account for the choice of organizational form among 
New York law firms.  Nonetheless, we test the profit-sharing version 
of the quality signaling theory in Part III of this article.  If Levin and 
Tadelis are correct that the partnership form signals profit-sharing to 
customers, and if this fact fully explains the benefits provided by the 
partnership form, then all or nearly all of the firms in our sample 
should be LLPs, as the LLP provides all of the profit-sharing benefits 
of the partnership form without the accompanying costs of unlimited 
liability necessitated by the GP form.35
E. Preventing “Grabbing and Leaving”
According to the grab and leave theory of partnership, certain 
types of businesses—specifically, the practice of law—benefit from 
an up or out system of partnership.36  This is because, over time, 
attorneys develop client-specific assets in the form of knowledge and 
expertise in the handling of specific clients.  This expertise gives 
senior lawyers significant power over their employers.  By 
threatening to “grab” their clients and leave the firm, these lawyers 
can extract a higher share of the firm’s profits.
To prevent senior lawyers from “grabbing” their clients and 
leaving the firm, law firms develop the up or out system of 
partnership in which associates are either fired before they get a 
chance to develop a relationship with clients or are promoted to 
34 This is the essence of proposition 3 in their paper. Id. at 10.
35 See supra note __ and accompanying text (describing this hypothesis in more detail).
36 See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An 
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 
(1985); James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the 
Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms (working paper on file with authors); MARC GALANTER & 
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991).
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residual claimants on the firm’s assets.37  This system is more 
important in law firms than in conventional firms because law firms 
lack the ability to establish property rights in client-specific 
knowledge.
The partnership structure effectively eliminates the defection of 
partners, by maximizing profits per partner, rather than total profits.38
According to Rebitzer and Taylor, only under the partnership 
struc ture can senior attorneys be paid enough to prevent them from 
grabbing and leaving with the firm’s clients because the partnership 
struc ture results in higher profits per partner, even though the 
corporation results in higher total profits.39
The Rebitzer and Taylor theory, however, is not a convincing 
explanation of the benefits of the partnership form.  Rebitzer and 
Taylor assume that corporations are, by definition, entrepreneur-
owned firms and that partnerships are, by definition, employee-
owned firms.40  Because employee-owned firms are more profitable 
under certain circumstances that are important to professional firms, 
many economists believe that this fact explains the prevalence of the 
partnership structure among professional firms and the prevalence of 
the corporate structure among industrial firms.  However, neither 
corporations nor LLCs are necessarily entrepreneur-owned firms.  In 
fact, it is quite common in close corporations and small LLCs to see a 
complete overlap of ownership and management, as is the case in a 
partnership.
Nonetheless, we test the grab and leave hypothesis in Part III of 
this article.  The LLP and GP are identical in the extent to which they 
foster profit-sharing and would thus equally prevent grabbing and 
leaving.  Accordingly, if the grab and leave theory fully explains the 
advantages of partnership relative to other organizational forms, then 
37 The firm is unable to write enforceable contracts that effectively prevent grabbing and 
leaving due to the ABA Model Rules, which prohibit contracts that limit a client’s freedom to choose her 
lawyer.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6; Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their 
Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1988); Rebitzer & 
Taylor, supra note __, at __.
38 Rebitzer & Taylor, supra note __, at 10.
39 Id. at 12.
40 Id.
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all or nearly all of the firms in our sample should be LLPs because 
the LLP provides all of the benefits of profit-sharing without any of 
the GP’s associated costs stemming from unlimited liability.41
F. Incentives to Mentor
One of the more creative justifications for the partnership form 
involves mentoring.42  The mentoring theory begins from the premise 
that much professional work requires the development of human 
capital and many professionals require mentoring in order to enhance 
their skills.  The junior associate, for instance, needs a senior partner 
to teach her how to conduct a trial or close a deal.  As the 
professional ages, however, she has an incentive to horde her 
knowledge and avoid mentoring new entrants to the profession.  She 
would prefer to take her knowledge and leave the firm, keeping all of 
the benefits of her knowledge to herself.  Partnerships, however, are 
relatively illiquid forms of investment, making exit difficult.  To 
maintain a pool of skilled workers to promote, the senior professional 
engages in mentoring.  This mentoring is profitable because it 
increases the return on the partner’s illiquid investment in the 
partnership.
Mentoring is not a wholly satisfactory explanation for the 
existence of partnership and almost certainly fails to explain the 
choice of organizational form among New York law firms.  Close 
corporations, LLCs, and LLPs also represent relatively illiquid 
investments.  In fact, such investments can be made just as illiquid as 
a partnership interest through the use of fairly routine restrictions on 
the transfer of interests.  In addition, although the partnership default 
rules create an illiquid investment, as an empirical matter most 
partnership agreements have buyout provisions ameliorating this 
effect.43
41 See supra note __ (explaining this hypothesis in more detail).
42 See Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human 
Capital, OFRC Working Paper Series (2003)
43 See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, Univ. of Illinois  Public Law Research Paper No. 
03-11 at 12 (2003) [hereinafter, Ribstein Corporations].
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Nonetheless, we test the mentoring theory in Part III of this 
article.  Because there is no liquidity difference between the GP and 
LLP (in fact, a firm that files for LLP status need not alter the 
underlying GP agreement, leaving any buyout provisions completely 
unaltered), if mentoring fully explains the advantage of the 
partnership relative to other organizational forms, then all or nearly 
all of the firms in our sample should be LLPs.  This is because, like 
all of the partnership theories based on illiquidity or profit-sharing 
explanations, the LLP provides all of the purported benefits of the 
GP, without the accompanying costs of unlimited liability.44
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Data Collection
To explore the choice and determinants of organizational form, 
we collected data on the choice of organizational form among New 
York law firms—that is, law firms listing New York City as their 
primary office—with more than twenty-five lawyers.45  We limited 
our study to New York City firms for a variety of reasons.46  By 
restricting our sample to firms in a particular region, we were able to 
minimize variations in the choice of organizational form based on 
44 See supra note __ and accompanying text (describing this hypothesis in more detail).
45 We did not study law firms with fewer than 25 attorneys.  These small firms may differ from 
their larger counterparts in ways that significantly affect their choice of organizational form, rendering 
them poor subjects for our study.  For example, very small firms could differ from large firms in terms 
of culture, practice area, and the impact of various laws (such as the New York City tax on LLPs ).  In 
addition, small associations of lawyers may be less a “firm” than a grouping of lawyers that share office 
space and resources, but lack a common goal, history, and culture.  See Bruce M. Price, How Green Was 
My Valley?  An Examination of Tournament Theory As A Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law 
Firms, 37 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 731, 742 (2003) (excluding law firms of fewer than ten lawyers from an 
empirical study of Silicon Valley firms for similar reasons)
46 Bob Hillman, who constructs a nationwide database of law firms, has done one of the two 
other major empirical studies examining the choice of organizational form by law firms.  See Robert W. 
Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 BUS. LAW.
1387, 1397- 1402 (2003).  Although a welcome addition to the literature, Hillman does not use the data 
to test the economic theories concerning partnerships.  Eric Talley and John Romley also conduct a 
major nationwide empirical study.  John Romley & Eric Talley, Uncorporated Professionals, CLEO
Research Paper Series, No C0418 (2004).  We discuss their results in detail infra note ___.  
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geographic or cultural differences, differences in the state legal 
regime or ethics code, and differences in state and local tax codes.47
Under the supervision of the two authors, research assistants 
collected most of the data.  The data, along with a detailed memo 
describing the collection process, are publicly available at [web 
address to be added].
There are 147 firms in the sample.  We used seven sources to 
build the dataset: (1) Martindale-Hubble, both print and web 
versions; (2) the Directory of Legal Employers (NALP), both print 
and web versions; (3) filings from the New York Secretary of State; 
(4) the list of profits per partner for the top 200 law firms published 
by the American Lawyer; (5) American Lawyer Media, Corporate 
Counsel Division, Directory of In-House Law Departments at the 
Top 250 Companies (hereinafter, The Directory of In-House 
Departments);48 (6) individual law firm websites; and (7) telephone 
conversations with selected law firms to verify or clarify certain 
information.  We then supplemented this empirical data with a series 
47 For example, converting from a PC to an LLP has significant negative tax consequences.  
Johnson, Limited Liability, supra note __, at 85, n. 19 (Nov. 1995) (stating that, “[w]hile a PC may also 
convert to an LLCor an LLP, there are significant tax impediments to such a conversion in that it will be 
treated as a liquidation under I.R.C. § 336 (1988)”).  In addition, many firms in states whose PC statute 
(unlike New York’s) provided an advantageous liability shield converted from GPs to PCs some time 
ago.  As a result, these firms are effectively prohibited from filing as an LLP, even if they might desire 
to do so.  Similarly, in some jurisdictions, local tax codes may affect the choice of organizational form.  
For example, New York City and New York State taxes PCs more heavily than partnerships.  See
Terrence A. Oved, New York State Limited Liability Partnerships, N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 39 
(noting that “[g]eneral partnerships do not pay . . . state tax on their profit but rather a 4% 
unincorporated business tax to New York City” and “a law firm organized as a professional corporation 
must make an annual tax payment of up to 1.8% and approximately 9% of its net income, respectively, 
to New York State and New York City”).  Presumably because of these tax considerations, as well as the 
fact that New York’s PC statute is not a superior liability shield to the LLP, only two firms filed for PC 
status after the LLP statute was enacted.
48 A searchable version of The Directory of In-House Departments is available at 
http://solis.365media.com/alm/search.asp?cat=987223.  The Directory of In-House Departments 
includes information collected and printed in the November issue of American Lawyer Media’s 
Corporate Counsel magazine in the article entitled “Who Represents America’s Biggest Companies?” as 
well as additional biographical data that was independently compiled by American Lawyer Media’s 
Corporate Counsel Division.  We compiled a list of the number of each firm’s Fortune 250 clients, if 
any, and the number of in-house counsel employed by those clients by searching the directory in May 
2004.
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of interviews of individuals active in and knowledgeable about the 
choice of organizational form by New York law firms.
1. Number of Lawyers (LAWYERS), Number of Offices 
(OFFICES), and Growth Rate (GROWTH)
Martindale-Hubble and NALP provided firm names, number of 
lawyers (LAWYERS), number of offices (OFFICES), choice of 
organizational form (FORM), and was used to calculate each firm’s 
growth rate (GROWTH).  We verified the Martindale-Hubble and 
NALP information through the New York Secretary of State’s office, 
by consulting firm websites and, in a few cases, by calling the firm’s 
offices to verify information that remained unclear after consulting 
the website.
LAWYERS is the total number of attorneys at each firm in 
2004.  OFFICES is the total number of each firm’s separate offices in 
2004.  LAWYERS and OFFICES were collected from the 
Martindale-Hubble website.49  OFFICES was then cross-checked 
against each firm’s website.50
GROWTH is the yearly percentage change in each firm’s 
total number of attorneys, averaged from 1994-2003.51  For reasons 
detailed below, GROWTH was calculated using two sources: the 
print versions of NALP and Martindale-Hubble.  This calculation 
was done by dividing the firms into three categories: (1) firms that 
NALP listed in every year for the period 1994–2003; (2) firms that 
NALP did not list for any year during the period 1994–2003; and (3) 
49 See http://martindale.com/xp/Martindale/home.xml.
50 When the number of offices listed on the firm’s website conflicted with the number of offices 
provided by Martindale-Hubble, we used the number of offices listed on the firm’s website.  Both the 
Martindale-Hubble search and the website cross-checks were conducted in March 2004.
51
 Except as otherwise noted, we include within the attorney count for GROWTH all firm 
members with a J.D. degree, including partners, associates, counsel, and of counsel, but do not include 
retired partners.  We include individuals regardless of whether the individual has been admitted to a bar 
or whether bar passage is still pending.  Data on the number of lawyers is not available for all firms for 
every year between 1994 and 2003.  In such cases, “GROWTH” is the average growth rate for the 
subset of years for which growth data is available.   
In addition, for the years 1994-2003 we did not collect data on the number of lawyers for PCs and 
LLCs.  Hence, GROWTH is defined for GP and LLP firms only.  
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firms that NALP listed in some years during the period 1994–2002, 
but not in others.52
For a variety of reasons, NALP is both a more reliable and more 
user-friendly source for calculating law firm growth rates.53
Accordingly, we used NALP to calculate GROWTH whenever 
possible.
For the first category of firms (those listed in NALP every year 
for the period 1994–2003), we used NALP data for every year.54  For 
the second category of firms (those that NALP did not list for any 
year during the period 1994–2003), we used Martindale-Hubble data 
for every year.55
For the third category of firms (those listed in NALP for some 
years, but not for others), we compared the available NALP data to 
the Martindale-Hubble data for any missing NALP years and 
determined whether the Martindale-Hubble data followed the yearly 
trend in growth rates calculated from the NALP data.  If consistent, 
we used the Martindale-Hubble data for the years the firm was not 
listed in NALP.  If inconsistent, we disregarded the previously 
52 Due to inconsistencies and apparent errors in reporting by NALP and/or Martindale-Hubble 
during the time frame of our study, various firm-specific decisions were made about how certain 
information on GROWTH would be treated.  These decisions are detailed in a memo available on our 
website, which is available at http:// Add web address here.
53 For example, NALP provides information on firm demographics that includes the number of 
lawyers (although, as discussed infra note __, this number is sometimes a firm-wide number and at other 
times an office-wide number).  In contrast, Martindale-Hubble lists lawyers within a firm by name and 
does not provide a total number, thus increasing the likelihood of error caused when individual names 
(in some cases, more than 1000) must be counted by hand.  Furthermore, Martindale-Hubble sometimes 
lists all of the firm’s lawyers under the heading for the New York office.  At other times, it lists only the 
New York lawyers under this heading.  As a result, every office for every firm must be cross-checked 
against every other office for that firm to determine whether lawyers have been double-listed under both 
New York and a branch office.
54 NALP lists each firm’s number of attorneys under “Firm Demographics.”  Sometimes this 
number represents each attorney employed by the firm.  At other times, it represents only the number of 
attorneys in the New York office.  When the “Firm Demographics” listed only the New York attorneys, 
attorneys from other offices were added in from the firm’s “Narrative Description” or from the “Other 
Offices” category.
55 As noted supra note __, in order to calculate GROWTH from Martindale-Hubble, we had to 
hand-count the attorneys that were listed by name in every office for each firm.  On some occasions, 
Martindale-Hubble did not list associates, but instead listed only partners, counsel, and of-counsel.  In 
order to maintain a consistent counting method for each firm across time, if the firm did not list 
associates in any single year, we did not count associates – even if they were listed – in any other year.  
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collected NALP data and recalculated the firm’s growth rate using 
Martindale-Hubble data for every year.
2. Organizational Form (FORM), Filing Date (DATE), Whether 
the Firm Is Domestic or Foreign (FOREIGN), and Designation 
of New York City as the Firm’s Main Office
We verified each firm’s organizational form (and, for firms that 
were organized as LLPs, LLCs, or PCs, collected filing date 
information) from filings with the New York Secretary of State’s 
office.56  We considered a firm’s main office to be located in New 
York City if the Martindale-Hubble website designated the New 
York City office as the firm’s “main office.”  If Martindale-Hubble 
reported a firm as having multiple main offices, we concluded that 
the firm’s main office was in New York City, so long as one of the 
main offices was located in New York City.
FOREIGN indicates those firms headquartered outside of the 
United States, but who report to Martindale-Hubble that their main 
United States office is located in New York City.  All main office 
results were cross-checked against each individual firm website.  If 
the individual website conflicted with the designation in Martindale-
Hubble, we listed the main office as it appeared on the firm’s 
website.57
3. Profits Per Partner (PROFITS) 
The American Lawyer magazine provided the partner profit 
data.  American Lawyer has two series of profit data.  One series 
56 We gathered this information in March 2004, from a searchable website maintained by The 
New York Secretary of State, located at http://appsext5.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/enter_search.  In 
several cases, the choice of organizational form indicated by Martindale-Hubble or NALP varied from 
information provided by the law firm’s website and the New York Secretary of State’s Office.  In these 
cases, we used the information provided by the New York Secretary of State.
57 For example, Martindale-Hubble lists Milberg, Weiss as having its main office in New York.  
However, the firm’s website indicates that its main office is in San Diego.  Accordingly, we adopted the 
website’s designation of the firm’s main office and excluded Milberg, Weiss from our sample.  This 
cross-check was conducted in March 2004.
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reports profits per partner on the 100 most profitable firms in the 
United States (the AmLaw 100).  A second series, the AmLaw200, 
provides profit data on the “second 100” – firms that rank between 
101 and 200 in terms of profitability.58  Thirty-six firms in the sample 
are among the 200 most profitable law firms in the country. 
4. Average Number of In-House Counsel (IN-HOUSE-AVG), 
Total Number of In-House Counsel (IN-HOUSE-TOTAL), and 
Number of Clients in the Fortune 250 (FORTUNE)
The number of a firm’s clients in the Fortune 250 (FORTUNE) 
was used as a proxy for client sophistication and, thus, for the level 
of information asymmetry between lawyer and client.  The theory 
behind the FORTUNE variable is that firms that have more clients in 
the Fortune 250 have clients who are more informed regarding the 
quality and pricing of legal services than do law firms with fewer 
numbers of clients in the Fortune 250.  As a result, there is a lower 
level of information asymmetry between the lawyer and client in 
these firms than in others and they, therefore, have less need to signal 
quality by being a GP.
In addition, both the average number of in-house counsel (IN-
HOUSE-AVG) and the total number of in-house counsel (IN-
HOUSE-TOTAL) were used as a proxy for the level of client-lawyer 
information asymmetry.59  Consistent with prior research on the role 
of in-house counsel in reducing this asymmetry, our theory was that 
firms with a higher number of both average and total in-house 
counsel should have lower levels of information asymmetry and, 
therefore, less need to signal quality by remaining a GP.
58
 The American Lawyer publishes the AmLaw 100 in the July edition of the magazine and the 
AmLaw 200 in the August edition of the magazine.   See, e.g., The AMLAW 100, 2004, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER, July 2004, at 91; The AMLAW 200, 2004, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, August 2004, at 83.  Data 
on the AmLaw 100 was available for the years 1993-2003.  The American Lawyer only published data 
on the AmLaw 200 for the years 1999-2003.
59 See Ryon Lancaster & Brian Uzzi, From Colleague to Employee: Determinants of Changing 
Career Governance Structures in Elite U.S. Law Firms (working draft on file with author) (using this 
same variable to test the level of information asymmetries in the market for legal services).
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The Directory of In-House Departments provided client 
information and information on each client’s number of in-house 
counsel.60  Of the 118 firms that are LLPs or GPs, only forty firms 
have clients in the Fortune 250.
5. Starting Associate Salaries (SALARY), Multi-Tiered 
Partnership Structure (TIER), and Collegiality (COLLEGIAL)
NALP provided starting associate salaries, whether the firm used 
a multi-tiered partnership structure, and whether the firm self-
identified as collegial.  TIER indicates whether or not the firm 
employs a multi-tier partnership structure.  TIER was collected from 
the NALP On-Line Directory of Legal Employers for the fifty-four 
firms in our sample that are included in the on-line directory.61
COLLEGIAL indicates whether or not the firm self-identifies as 
collegial.  Firms can identify themselves as collegial through the 
narrative description that they provide to NALP for publication.  A 
research assistant labeled the sixty firms in our sample that were 
listed in the 2002-2003 NALP directory (print version) as 
congenial/collegial or not congenial/collegial.  To determine which 
category the firm best fit in, we examined the narrative information 
included in their NALP entry.  Descriptions of the firms that stressed 
“teamwork,” a “congenial” or “collegial” environment, and 
“friendly,” or “close-working relationships” were coded as collegial.  
Firms that did not mention any of these characteristics in their 
narrative description were coded as uncollegial.62
60 The searchable directory is available at 
http://solis.365media.com/alm/search.asp?cat=987223.  The variables were constructed by searching for 
each firm’s name in the directory.  If the firm has Fortune 250 clients, then the directory provides the 
client names, along with the number of in-house-counsel employed by each client.
61 This information was collected from the NALP web directory in June, 2004.  The NALP web 
directory is located at http://www.nalpdirectory.com/.  There is an entry on each form entitled 
“Partnership Data.”  One item under this heading is “Two or more tiers?”, to which firms respond “yes” 
or “no”.
62 See Gorman, supra note _ (using the NALP narrative descriptions to construct a dummy 
variable for whether or not the firm was collegial).
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One might expect that every firm would advertise its 
congeniality as a marketing tool, rendering firms’ narrative 
statements a poor proxy for collegiality.  In fact, however, there is 
great variation in the narrative descriptions and only 44% of the New 
York firms in our sample were coded as collegial.63  In addition, 
COLLEGIAL was negatively associated with TIER as one would 
expect if these two variables are acting as a proxy for the firm’s level 
of collegiality. 
SALARY measures each firm’s starting associate salary as 
reported in the NALP On-Line Directory of Legal Employers.64  All 
salaries are those reported for 2003, except in the case of two firms 
that provided only 2004 salary information.65  SALARY was 
calculated for the fifty-seven firms in our sample for which such 
information was provided in the On-Line Directory.
6. Raw Data
The raw data for New York law firms are attached as 
Appendices A–D to this article.  Appendix A lists LAWYERS, 
FORM, OFFICES, DATE, and GROWTH for all firms in the sample.
Appendix B reports TIER, SALARY, and COLLEGIAL for the 
subset firms for which such information was available.66  Appendix 
C lists IN-HOUSE-AVG, IN-HOUSE-TOTAL, and FORTUNE for 
the subset of firms for which such information is available.  
Appendix D contains the PROFITS da ta.
B. Empirical Results
63 Similarly, in a national study of collegiality at law firms using this same coding method, only 
about 20% of the firms were coded as collegial, and collegiality was negatively associated with a multi-
tiered partnership structure. See Gorman, supra note __.
64 This information was collected from the NALP web directory in June, 2004.  The NALP web 
directory is located at http://www.nalpdirectory.com/.
65 The firms are Thacher, Proffit, & Wood and Friedman, Kaplan, Siler, & Adelman.
66 Note that information on each variable is not available for all firms in Appendix B.  A blank 
space indicates that information on this variable was unavailable for the firm in question.  
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1. General Results
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report summary statistics for the data 
collected on New York law firms.  As is evident, the large majority 
of firms (67%) are LLPs, whereas only 13% are GPs.67  The average 
number of offices is higher for LLPs than for GPs, as is the average 
number of lawyers.  As demonstrated in the logit model in Part 
II.B.3.b, however, neither of these variables is a statistically 
significant predictor of the choice of organizational form.
Table 1
Overall Statistics
Firm Type Total Number Percentage of Sample
GP 19 13 %
LLP 99 67 %
PC 27 18 %
LLC 2 1 %
Table 2
GP Summary Statistics
Avg. Number of Offices 4.263158
Std. Dev. Number of Offices 3.841905
Avg. Number of Lawyers 181.1579
Std. Dev. Number of Lawyers 214.7811
Table 3
LLP Summary Statistics
Avg. Number of Offices 5.232323
Std. Dev. Number of Offices 6.54471
Avg. Number of Lawyers 240.798
Std. Dev. Number of Lawyers 446.6612
2. Filing Patterns
67 The remaining firms are PCs and LLCs.  See infra note __ (breaking down these numbers).
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In order to examine law firm filing patterns, we divided the 
firms in our sample into large firms, small firms, and elite firms.68
Information regarding the LLP filing dates of large firms, small 
firms, and elite firms is graphically depicted in Chart 1.  
[Insert Chart 1 Here]
As the bar chart shows, LLP filings peaked in 1994–1995, the 
two- year period after New York’s LLP statute became effective, and 
were distributed roughly equally between large and small firms.  Few 
elite firms filed during this time period.
LLP filings then tapered off, but began rising again between 
2001 and 2003.  Unlike the 1994–1995 filing period, large firms 
dominate the LLP filings during the 2001-2003 period.  In particular, 
a large number of elite law firms filed during this period, roughly 
coinciding with two events: the Arthur Andersen trial and 
bankruptcy, and the large numbers of securities fraud suits 
accompanying the stock market downtown associated with the burst 
of the “dotcom” bubble.
Given the large numbers of securities offerings in which these 
firms are involved, and the corresponding liability fears that may 
result, we theorized that many large and elite law firms may have 
consciously chosen this time frame in which to seek liability 
protection.  This conjecture is supported by our interview data.  Our
follow-up interviews reveal that both rising liability fears and the 
Arthur Andersen bankruptcy were salient factors associated with 
many firms’ decisions to opt for LLP status.69
LLP filing dates plotted against 2003 PROFITS are graphically 
depicted in Chart 2.70
68
“Large firms” are firms with more than 50 lawyers.  “Small firms” are firms with between 25 
and 50 lawyers.  “Elite firms” are defined as firms with more than $1 million in profits per partner for 
2002.
69 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Arthur Andersen and rising liability 
fears as salient factors in law firms’ choice of organizational form).
70 Because per partner profit data is reported in American Lawyer for only the 200 most 
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[Insert Chart 2 Here]
The chart shows a rough bunching of LLP filings that 
corresponds with PROFITS.  As discussed in more detail in Part IV, 
we believe that this is attributable to a concern by firms with the 
negative signal that may accompany an LLP filing.  However, as 
more firms that the decision-making firm considers to be a 
competitor convert to LLP status, the negative signal is muted.  For 
this reason, firms tend to file with their cohort.  The interview data 
supports this notion that firms account for the actions of competitor 
firms when making a decision regarding organizational form.71
Two apparent outliers in Chart 2 are noteworthy:  the LLP filing 
of Milbank, Tweed on February 1, 1999, and the LLP filing of 
Skadden, Arps on May 25, 2001.  Both of these firms filed early 
relative to firms with comparable profits-per-partner, and both filings 
were noted with interest by their cohort firms.  The Milbank filing 
closely followed the conviction and sentencing of Milbank partner 
John Gellene in the summer of 1998 to fifteen months in federal 
prison for filing false declarations in a bankruptcy proceeding.72
Although several partners at New York firms surmised during 
interviews that the Gellene incident may have made liability matters 
more salient at Milbank and prompted the firm’s early filing, our 
interviews with Milbank suggest that this was not the case.73  The 
Skadden filing in 2001 gained the attention of many elite New York 
firms and, according to our interviews, caused many firms to begin 
reevaluating the decision of whether to become an LLP.74  Although 
many interviewees indicated that the firm eventually decided to wait 
profitable firms in the United States, only 36 of our original sample of 147 firms are included on this 
chart.
71 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
72 See MILTON REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
(forthcoming 2004) (draft on file with the authors); Laura Perlman, Trading One Striped Suit (With 
Cuffs) For Another, 20 AM. LAWYER 10 (Oct. 1998) (discussing the Gellene incident).
73 Confidential interview with Milbank partner (interview notes on file with the authors) 
(attributed with permission of interview subject).
74 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
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until firms within their cohort other than Skadden were prepared to 
file before their own firm was willing to file, the event was clearly a 
salient trigger in many firms’ decision-making processes.75
Another area in which law firms compete is starting associate 
salaries.76  Accordingly, we predicted that law firms might also look 
to the behavior of firms with whom they compete on starting salaries 
in making decisions about organizational form, resulting in clusters 
when associate starting salaries are plotted against filing dates.  LLP 
filing dates plotted against first year associate starting salaries are 
graphically depicted in Chart 3.  Unfortunately, at this point in time, 
there is so little variation in starting associate salaries among the New 
York firms for which data is available that the chart reveals no useful 
information.
3. Testing the Partnership Theories
a. Profit-Sharing and Illiquidity-Based Theories
In Part II of this article, we discussed four theories of 
partnership that are based on the purported benefits of profit sharing 
through partnership:  insurance, monitoring, quality signaling, and 
preventing grabbing and leaving.  In addition, we discussed one 
partnership theory—mentoring—that relies on the illiquidity benefits 
of the partnership form.  As noted, there are reasons to approach each 
of these theories with suspicion because, assuming that profit-sharing 
and illiquidity are valuable attributes in at least some business and 
professional organizations, the partnership form is unnecessary to 
provide these benefits.  Both profit-sharing and illiquidity can be, and 
frequently are, replicated through a variety of organizational forms, 
including the LLC, PC, and corporation.
75 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
76 See Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps Its Wings in Menlo Park: An Organizational Analysis 
of Increases in Associate Salaries (demonstrating that law firms compete on associate salaries, even 
when doing so appears to make little sense as an economic matter) (unpublished draft on file with the 
authors).
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Nonetheless, each of these theories generates a testable 
hypothesis.  If any of these partnership theories fully explains the 
benefits of the partnership form, then all or nearly all of the firms in 
our sample should be LLPs, because the LLP provides the same 
illiquidity and profit-sharing features of the GP, without the 
accompanying costs of unlimited liability.  Contrary to the 
predictions of the illiquidity and profit-sharing based hypotheses, a 
sizeable number of firms in our sample remain GPs.
Standing alone, however, our empirical data allow us only to 
reject the illiquidity and profit-sharing based theories of partnership 
as the sole motivation for the choice of organizational form among 
New York law firms.  However, our theoretical objections to these 
theories, detailed throughout this article, cause us to doubt that they 
are even contributing factors in the choice of organizational form, 
much less decisive ones.
b. Limited Liability, Monitoring, and Collegiality
1)Results
As discussed in Part II of this article, several partnership theories 
rely on the purported benefits of unlimited liability.  Under the 
monitoring theory, unlimited liability induces partners to more 
carefully scrutinize each other.  This monitoring becomes more 
difficult with increased size, rate of growth, and geographic 
dispersion of the firm.  In contrast, the collegiality theory of 
partnership asserts that the willingness to face personal liability for a 
partner’s acts generates trust and collegiality within the firm.  Larger 
groups, quickly growing groups, more geographically dispersed 
groups, and firms with multi-tiered partnership structures are 
considered less collegial than small, closely-knit groups, in which all 
members are treated equally.  In addition, some law firms self-
identify as collegial in their NALP narrative statement whereas 
others do not.  Accordingly, the monitoring and collegiality 
partnership theories each yield a testable hypothesis:  if either of 
these theories is a significant rationale for the choice of 
organizational form among New York law firms, then regression 
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results should reveal a statistically significant effect of LAWYERS, 
OFFICES, and GROWTH, and in the case of the collegiality theory, 
TIER and COLLEGIAL, on the choice of organizational form.
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated a logit model with 
the dependent discrete variable being whether the firm was an LLP or 
GP.  The independent variables are LAWYERS, OFFICES, 
GROWTH, and whether the firm is domestic or foreign (FOREIGN).  
The model had 117 observations.  Although there are a total of 118 
GPs and LLPs in the data, GROWTH was unavailable for one firm.
As Table 4 reports, the coefficients on all variables are 
insignificant.77  Note, however, that OFFICES and LAWYERS are 
correlated, raising the possibility of a multicollinearity problem.    
Without using additional independent variables or collecting more 
data, we cannot correct for this problem.78  With this qualification in 
mind, the initial indications from the data are that neither the 
monitoring nor the collegiality hypotheses find much support.
Table 4
Logit estimates                                            Number of obs = 117
Log pseudo-likelihood = -49.7556                      Pseudo R2 = 0.0414
Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
LAWYERS .0003985   .0007504     0.53  0.595    -.0010723    .0018693
OFFICES .0283613   .0524437     0.54   0.589    -.0744265    .1311491
GROWTH .0011623     .01928     0.06   0.952    -.0366258    .0389503
77 We also ran a probit model, which assumes a slightly different structure.  See WILLIAM 
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 814-15 (2d ed 2000).  As in the logit model, the coefficients on all 
variables were insignificant.  In a provocative new working paper, Eric Talley and John Romley conduct 
a nationwide inquiry into law firm choice of form.  They find that a firm’s size – measured in terms of 
number of lawyers in 1993 – is a statistically significant predicator of the law firm’s choice of 
organizational form as of 1999.  Romley & Talley, supra note __, at 31-32 & Table 11.  [insert further 
discussion of Romley/Talley Paper].
78 Dropping one of the correlated variables is a common but incorrect fix for multicollinearity.  
See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 182  (3d ed 1992).  Because this incorrect correction 
is frequently used, however, we also ran two additional models.  In the first model, we dropped 
LAWYERS as an independent variable, but kept OFFICES.  In the second model, we dropped 
OFFICES, and kept LAWYERS.  Neither OFFICES nor LAWYERS was significant when run without 
the presence of the other in the regression.   
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FOREIGN -1.748595       .9146515 -1.91   0.056    -3.541279    .0440886
CONST 1.566562           .3697773 4.24 0.000      .8418118    2.291312
The logit results are based on a relatively small number of firms, 
an unavoidable problem for this population.  Although we collected 
data on all New York City firms listed in Martindale-Hubble and 
NALP with more than twenty-five lawyers, rather than drawing a 
sample of such firms, this is, nonetheless, still a limited number of 
observations.79
As an additional check on the robustness of the significance 
results, we bootstrapped the sample, a process that involves re-
sampling from the data.  The computational technique randomly 
draws with replacement a new sample from the data at hand.80  The 
logit model is then run on each of the bootstrapped samples.81
Because bootstrapping re-samples from the same data, it is only 
appropriate when certain assumptions are met.  Specifically:
We must be prepared to assume that the empirical 
distribution function represented by the sample is a 
good estimator of the population distribution function 
that generated the sample in the first place.  That is, 
we must believe that a representative sample of all 
possible distinct values of the population is found in 
the data.82
79 Some firms, especially smaller firms, may choose not to list in Martindale-Hubble or NALP 
because such listing involves a fee.  So, while we are confident that our dataset includes most New York 
law firms, the data set may not include all New York firms.  This potential selection bias among smaller 
firms is one reason that we did not include in our sample firms with fewer than 25 lawyers.
80 See CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & ROBERT D. DUVAL, BOOTSTRAPPING: A NONPARAMETRIC 
APPROACH TO STATISTICAL INFERENCE 9-15 (1993) (describing how bootstrapping works generally)
81 Bootstrapping is useful in developing confidence intervals.  Id. at 60.  However, the 
parameter estimates from bootstrapping are unreliable, a problem that does not concern us here, as we 
are concerned only with the significance of the results.  Id.
82 Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
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We believe that our dataset meets this assumption because of the 
method of data collection.  As previously noted, our dataset 
represents the entire population of New York City firms with more 
than twenty-five lawyers, as reported by Martindale-Hubble and 
NALP.83
Table 5 summarizes the bootstrapping results.  The coefficients 
on GROWTH, LAWYER, and OFFICE are insignificant for all three 
methods for constructing bootstrap confidence intervals.84  The 
coefficient on FOREIGN was insignificant for two of the methods for 
constructing intervals and significant for one of the methods.85
Table 5
bootstrap statistics                                           Number of obs = 117
Replications = 1000
Variable     Reps Observed Bias  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
B_LAWYERS 1000  .0003985     -.00004   .0015948   -.002731     .0035279  (N)
-.0031016   .0037558  (P)
-.0030128   .004021   (BC)
B_OFFICES 1000  .0283613   .0253877 .0859417     -.1402856   .1970082   (N)
-.0809225   .2596718   (P)
-.1091741   .1871728 (BC)
B_GROWTH 1000     .0011623    .0054339 .0309361 -.0595449   .0618694   (N)
-.0491735   .0783014   (P)
-.0584999   .0620802 (BC)
B_FOREIGN 947 -1.74859   -.22967 1.334121 -4.366775   .8695839   (N)
-4.961497  -.0081233   (P)
-4.125079    .086775  (BC)
B_CONST 1000           1.566562    -.048501 .4290887  .7245433     2.408581   (N)
.7236955     2.400121    (P)
.8607135     2.549127 (BC)
83 See supra note __ (discussing the dataset).
84 See Mooney & Duval, supra note __, at 33-42 (describing the different ways to construct 
bootstrap confidence intervals).
85 The replication for FOREIGN occurred only 947 times.  This means that in 53 of the 
resamples, the sampling did not draw any foreign firms, making it impossible to run the logit on those 
resamples.
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Finally, as an additional test of the collegiality hypothesis, we 
estimated a logit model for the subset of fifty-three firms for which 
data on both COLLEGIAL and TIER was available.  Table 6 reports 
the logit results from this subsample.  As with the other models, the 
coefficients on all variables were statistically insignificant.
Table 6
Logit estimates                                            Number of obs = 53
Log pseudo-likelihood = -19.406266                       Pseudo R2 = 0.0619
Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
LAWYERS  .0002044            .0007751    0.26  0.792 -.0013147    .0017236
OFFICES .0511103   .0785404       0.65   0.515       -.1028261    .2050466
GROWTH -.0692595             .0474476 -1.46 0.144 -.1622552    .0237361
FOREIGN -1.390741   1.368034    -1.02    0.309     -4.07204      1.290557
COLLEGIAL .2180422        .8244907  0.26   0.791        -1.39793      1.834014
TIER -.002586       1.052599 -0.00   0.998    -2.065643    2.060471
CONST 1.979628     .7010438  2.82   0.005     .6056078     3.353649
However, one cannot make a strong inference from the results in 
Table 6.  The sample size is too small, making heavy reliance on the 
results unjustifiable.86
2)  Section Summary
To summarize this subsection, given the results on the entire 
sample, the bootstrapping results, and the preliminary results on 
firms reporting TIER and COLLEGIAL information, the indications 
from the data are that neither the monitoring nor the collegiality 
86 We also bootstrapped this smaller sample.  The coefficients on all variables were 
insignificant when bootstrapped.  However, we are not confident about these results, because the smaller 
sample is not representative of the population under study.  See Mooney & Duval, supra note __, at 60–
61 (discussing the limitations of the bootstrap technique).
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hypotheses find much support in the data.  Although the coefficient 
on FOREIGN was insignificant, except in one method for 
constructing intervals in the bootstrapping results, three out of eight 
foreign firms were GPs, a much higher proportion of GPs than in the 
total sample.  Although we hesitate to read too much into this result 
because of the small number of foreign firms in the sample, our 
interview results provide some insight into why the filing patterns 
among foreign firms, especially UK firms, may differ from the filing 
patterns of domestic firms.
For most law firms based outside of the United States, the New 
York office represents a relatively small percentage of the total 
partnership.  Accordingly, were the firm to seek liability protection, 
most would prefer another avenue, such as filing as a limited liability 
entity in their own country, to accomplish it.87  Although many 
jurisdictions have recently modernized their limited liability laws 
available to professional associations, making them more attractive, 
there are still impediments to limited liability in many jurisdictions.88
Accordingly, although many large law firms based outside of the 
United States are currently considering the issue of becoming a 
limited liability entity and many of our interview subjects predicted 
that all of the major international firms based outside of the United 
States would soon follow the lead of the domestic firms, these 
practical impediments have slowed the process among many foreign 
firms.89
87 Confidential interview with senior partner at foreign firm (interview notes on file with the 
authors).
88 For example, UK law firms that choose to limit their liability must make their financial 
statements publicly available, a requirement that has caused many UK firms to forgo the benefit of the 
statute.  Confidential interview with senior partner at foreign firm (interview notes on file with the 
authors).  In addition, law firms with a substantial German practice must contend with German tax laws 
that deem partnership goodwill recognized if the firm changes its organizational form.  Although it is 
apparently possible to get a firm-specific ruling waiving the statute, the ease and speed with which this 
occurs varies by jurisdiction.  Confidential interview with senior partner at foreign firm (interview notes 
on file with the authors).
89 One of the UK’s leading law firms, Allen & Overy, recently announced that it would become 
a UK LLP effective on May 1, 2004.  Many predict that other major UK firms will soon follow suit.  See
Bob Sherwood, Limited Liability: A Question of Protection, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2004).
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c. The Relationship Between Profits and Choice of Form
Recall that the unlimited liability version of the monitoring 
theory suggests that, because LLPs provide an inferior legal product, 
they must either (1) charge less, or (2) suffer reduced revenues.  As 
discussed below in Part IV, our interview data allow us to reject the 
first possibility.  This subsection considers the second possibility, 
investigating the link between choice of organizational form and 
profits-per-partner.  
As noted previously, we collected profit per partner data for the 
years 1993-2003 on the thirty-six firms in our sample that were listed 
among the 200 most profitable in the country. The goal of this 
section is to determine whether a switch in form from a GP to an LLP 
had any effect on firm profitability. This is a panel data set, in which 
we observe the same firms over a ten-year span.  During this span, 
thirty-one firms changed from a GP to LLP; five firms remained GPs.    
To tell whether a change of form had any effect on profits, we 
ran a fixed effects model that accounts for unobservable firm-specific 
traits and secular trends, both of which—if unaccounted for -- might 
affect profitability.90  The independent variables include dummy 
variables for the filing date and the lags of the filing date.  
The variable, FILING, equals one if the firm filed for LLP status 
in that year and zero otherwise.  The variable, FILLAG1, equals one 
if the firm filed as a LLP in the previous year and zero otherwise.  
The remaining variables, FILAG2, FILAG3, FILAG4, FILAG5, 
FILAG6, FILAG7, FILAG8, are defined in a similar fashion.  These 
lags of the filing date allowed us to examine whether the switch in 
form had a persistent and/or delayed impact on profits.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results.  The dependent variable in 
Table 7 is the level of profits.  The dependent variable in Table 8 is 
the log of profits.  The log function compresses the profit data, 
reducing the impact of outliers on the results.91  In both tables, we 
97 For a non-technical discussion of the fixed effects model, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, 
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 461-69 (2d ed. 2003)
91 See infra note __ (discussing the effect of the log function). 
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 39
39
suppress the estimates on the time dummy variables, which account 
for the secular trends.
Table 7
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs = 344
       R-squared = 0.9469
                                                                               Adj R-squared = 0.9370
                                                                      Root MSE = .13263
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm)
(firm | absorbed   (36 categories))
PROFITS Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
FILING -21609.24  44451.99     -0.49   0.627 -109099.9    65881.45
FILAG1 -87122.87      66141.12 -1.32   0.189     -217302.3    43056.51
FILAG2 -174052.5       83941.33 -2.07   0.039    -339266.4   -8838.649
FILAG3 -188951.5       101717.4 -1.86    0.064 -389152.3    11249.25
FILAG4 -160853.2       94466.6 -1.70   0.090        -346783        25076.56
FILAG5 -189750.6      81612.24 -2.33   0.021    -350380.3   -29120.87
FILAG6 -185928.1      79855.69 -2.33   0.021    -343100.6   -28755.63
FILAG7 -152261       88270.91 -1.72   0.086    -325996.4    21474.34
FILAG8 -164291.1       85617.34 -1.92   0.056    -332803.7    4221.523
CONST 602903.7       40501.57 14.89   0.000     523188.2     682619.1
Table 8
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs = 344
R-squared = 0.9469
Adj R-squared = 0.9370
Root MSE = .13263
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm)
(firm | absorbed   (36 categories))
Ln_PROFITS Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
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FILING -.009777       .0432551 -0.23   0.821     -.094912     .075358    
FILAG1 -.0536235       .0581945 -0.92   0.358       -.1681624   .0609154
FILAG2 -.0913073      .0690882 -1.32    0.187    -.2272872   .0446725
FILAG3 -.039976       .0660399 -0.61   0.545    -.1699561   .0900042  
FILAG4 .0460658        .0732625 0.63   0.530         -.09813       .1902616  
FILAG5 .0579672   .0644386 0.90         0.369      -.0688611   .1847956
FILAG6 .0793543        .0772123 1.03   0.305      -.0726155    .231324    
FILAG7 .1238531        .0881448 1.41   0.161         -.049634    . 2973402   
FILAG8 .1079902         .0796176 1.36   0.176 -.0487137   .2646941
CONST 13.23827      .0369417 358.36   0.000     13.16556    13.31098
As Table 7 reports, many of the filing variables are statistically 
significant and negative.  One must be careful, however, in 
interpreting the point estimates.   Take, for instance, the estimate on 
FILAG6, which is –185,928.1.  Roughly speaking, this means that, 
all else being equal, a firm that files for LLP status in 1997 will have 
$185,928 less profits in 2003. 
In Table 8, none of the filing variables are statistically 
significant and the point estimates flip signs, starting negative and 
turning positive as the length of the lag increases.92  The results in 
Table 8 caution us against reading too much into the results from 
Table 7.93  Given the results in Table 7, however, we cannot 
completely dismiss the possibility that a switch in form from a GP to 
an LLP reduces profitability, at least in the first few years.  
d. Unlimited Liability and Signaling
As discussed in Part II.D.1 of this article, unlimited liability is 
thought to send a positive signal to customers by indicating that, 
92
  When the dependant variable is the log of profits, the coefficient estimates represent the 
percentage change in profits.   So, for example, in Table 8, the estimate on FILAG2 equals -.09.  This 
means, all else equal, a switch in form from a GP to an LLP in 1999 leads to nine percent less profits in 
2001.
93
 The results from Table 7 do not seem to be the result of outliers.  We reran the model with profit 
levels as the dependant variable, but dropped the firms, which had, in 2003, the three highest profits per 
partner and the three lowest profits per partner.  The same results occur: The filing date coefficients are 
all negative and many of the lag variables are statistically significant.    
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because each partner’s personal assets are at stake in the event of her 
own or another partner’s blunder, each partner will take more care in 
the provision of legal services and will more carefully monitor other 
firm members.  Because the quality signaling theory depends on 
information asymmetry between the firm and its clients, the signaling 
theory suggests that firms whose clients possess less information 
regarding the quality of legal services they receive should have a 
greater need to engage in this type of quality signaling than firms 
whose clients are well informed regarding the quality of legal 
services.
To test this hypothesis, we predicted a positive, significant 
relationship between each of IN-HOUSE-AVG, IN-HOUSE-
TOTAL, and FORTUNE on the probability that a firm is an LLP. 
Tables 9 and 10 report the results on signaling.  In Table 9, FORM 
again serves as the discrete dependent variable.  The independent 
variables include GROWTH, OFFICES, and FOREIGN, plus 
FORTUNE.  The coefficients on LAWYERS, OFFICES, and 
FORTUNE are all insignificant.94  However, the coefficient on 
FOREIGN was significant in this model.95
Table 9
Logit estimates                                                         Number of obs = 117
Log pseudo-likelihood = -47.700453                                    Pseudo R2 = 0.0810
Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
LAWYERS .003625        .0029158 1.24   0.214    -.0020897    .0093398
OFFICES -.0196299       .063816     -0.31   0.758     -.144707      .1054471  
GROWTH -.0016844      .0195909 -0.09   0.931    -.0400818    .0367131    
FOREIGN -2.266825        1.073779 -2.11 0.035    -4.371393   -.1622578
94
 We also ran a model with whether the firm had any clients in the Fortune 250 as a dummy 
variable.  In this model as well, all the coefficients were statistically insignificant.
95
 Although we hesitate to read too much into this result because the data set includes so few 
foreign firms, the proportion of foreign firms that are GPs is much higher than in the total sample, and 
our interview results indicate that foreign firms face different issues concerning the choice of 
organizational form than do domestic firms.  See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing the 
foreign firms.)
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FORTUNE -.2088203       .1224337 -1.71   0.088        -.4487859    .0311453        
CONST  1.638935       .4037346 4.06   0.000       .8476294      2.43024
Table 10 summarizes the results from the last logit model.  The 
sample for this model contains only thirty-nine observations and, 
hence, the results are suggestive at best.  The sample includes only 
those firms who represent clients in the Fortune 250.  In this model, 
we add as an independent variable the log of the average number of 
in house counsel (IN-HOUSE-AVG) and the total number of in-
house counsel (IN-HOUSE-TOTAL).96  The coefficients on all 
variables are statistically insignificant.97
Table 10
Logit estimates                                                         Number of obs =  39
Log pseudo-likelihood = -14.818863                                     Pseudo R2 = 0.1150
Coef. Robust  
Std. Error
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
LAWYERS .0004058        .0029048 0.14   0.889    -.0052875     .006099
OFFICES  .167362        .1000963 1.67    0.095        -.028823       .3635471    
GROWTH -.1034546       .0860331 -1.20    0.229        -.2720763    .0651671   
IN-
HOUSE-
AVG
-.5099148       .6412853 -0.80     0.427        -1.766811    .7469813       
IN- -.0006731       .0008786 -0.77   0.444           -.0023951    .0010489
96
 The log is used because the figures on the average number of in-house counsel are skewed.  
The log operator minimizes the impact of this dispersion.  Consider an example: Shearman & Sterling 
represents six companies among the Fortune 250 with an average number of in-house counsel of 438.  
Morrison & Cohen represents one company with an in-house counsel office of 17 people.  Using just the 
average number of in-house counsel implies that the information asymmetry between Shearman and its 
clients is 25 times less than the information asymmetry between Morrison and Cohen and its clients.  
This seems unreasonable, and the log operator minimizes this difference.  See Steve Choi & Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance, __ S. CAL. 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2004) (noting that the “use of the log transformation . . . helps reduce the 
skewness in the distribution due to the superstar effect (resulting in a more normal distribution”).
97
 FOREIGN does not appear in this table because, for the firms in this small dataset, 
FOREIGN perfectly predicted the choice of form.  As a result the logit model could not run with 
FOREIGN.
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HOUSE-
TOTAL
CONST 4.375029        3.180182 1.38   0.169    -1.858014    10.60807
In contrast to the statistical tests of the other theories, the data 
here is weaker.  As a result, our conclusion is more tentative.  The 
proxies for information asymmetry are just that—proxies.98  That 
said, when combined with insights from our interview data, the data 
suggest that firms are not retaining unlimited liability to signal 
quality to the market.
4. Testing The Theories Revisited – A Duration Analysis
a.  Motivation for the Duration Analysis
The duration model is a time event study that measures the time 
that has elapsed before a certain event occurs.99  Unlike the logit 
model, which analyzes a firm’s choice of form at a particular moment 
in time, the duration model permits an analysis of choice of form as it 
changes over time.  In other words, whereas the logit model asks 
whether there are significant differences between firms that are GPs 
and firms that are LLPs, the duration model asks whether there are 
significant differences in the speed with which firms with certain 
characteristics became LLPs.  Unlike the logit model, the duration 
model thus allows us to examine whether the length of time it takes a 
firm to switch from the GP to LLP form correlates with the variables 
that economists predict are important in determining the choice of 
form.  Did, for example, larger firms or more geographically 
dispersed firms adopt LLP status more quickly than small firms with 
98
 In addition, if information asymmetry causes firms to remain a GP and information 
asymmetry causes clients to increase the number of in-house counsel, then, there is a simultaneity 
problem.  In this case, treating the number of in-house counsel as an exogenous variable will lead to 
incorrect results.  See GREENE, supra note __, at 652–53.  We thank Allen Ferrell for bringing this to our 
attention.
99
 For complete and more technical treatments of the duration model see JEFFREY M. 
WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 685-715 (2002) and 
Nicholas M. Kiefer, Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 646 (1988). 
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only one office?  This question can only be answered by looking at 
the firms over time.  
The duration model provides two other benefits as well.  First, 
the logit models discussed above may suffer from a problem of 
endogeneity.  The logit model assumes, for example, that the number 
of lawyers is exogenous.  In other words, it assumes that the number 
of lawyers is not influenced by the choice of form.  
As noted above, the hypothesis we would like to test is that the 
number of lawyers in the firm significantly impacts the probability 
that the firm will limit its liability.100   However, it is also possible 
that the firm’s choice of form determines the number of lawyers.  In 
other words, an LLP may have more lawyers precisely because it has 
limited its liability.  If this is the case, then it is the choice of form 
that drives the number of lawyers, rather than the other way around 
as hypothesized.  This same type of endogeneity problem is possible 
with the variables OFFICE, GROWTH, and FOREIGN as well, 
rendering the logit estimates potentially unreliable. 
To address this problem, we gathered data on the number of 
offices and the number of lawyers from 1994 to 2003.  Next, we used 
the fact that each firm filed for LLP status on a different date to 
control for endogeneity.     
To see how this works, consider Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & 
Flom LLP.  Skadden filed for LLP status on May 25, 2001.  The 
duration analysis asks whether the number of lawyers at Skadden in 
any one year influences the probability that Skadden files for LLP 
status in that same year, assuming that Skadden had not filed for LLP 
status up to that point in time.  The number of lawyers at Skadden 
after the filing date thus plays no role in the analysis, as the duration 
analysis ends with the filing date.  The temporal nature of the 
analysis mitigates the chance of endogeneity.  In contrast to the logit 
model (which is based on a snapshot of firm characteristics), 
100
 For reasons discussed supra note __, we did not predict whether this impact would be positive or 
negative.
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 45
45
endogeneity will be a problem in the duration model only if the firm 
adds or subtracts lawyers in anticipation of the switch in form.101
The final benefit of the duration model relates to sample size.  
Although we collected data on every New York law firm listed in 
Martindale-Hubble as having 25 or more lawyers, the logit models 
are based on a small sample size.  The duration analysis takes the 
same small sample and expands it by looking at each firm over a ten-
year period.  This increase in the sample size gives us more 
confidence in the results.
b. Description of Methodology
i.) The Duration Model
The duration model originated in medical studies in which 
researchers desired to study the length of time a patient survives after 
a particular treatment.102   For this reason, the duration model is
sometimes referred to as a survival model.  In a duration model, the 
key variable is the hazard rate.  The hazard rate is the probability that 
the event of interest occurs, given that the event has not occurred up 
to that point in time.103
To see this more clearly, consider an economic problem that has 
been subject to duration analysis: unemployment.104  In a duration 
analysis of unemployment, the event of interest is finding a job.  The 
hazard rate for a particular week is the probability the person finds
employment that week, given that the same individual has been 
unemployed for the previous weeks.  One policy issue is how 
unemployment benefits affect the hazard rate.105  If unemployment 
101 MARIO A. CLEVES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING STATA 166 (2004) 
(noting that in duration analysis, “researchers often ignore anticipation or delay effects.”) 
102 WOOLDRIDGE, supra note __, at 685.
103 See Kiefer, supra note __, at 649.
104
 For an early study of this sort, see Tony Lancaster, Econometric Methods for the Duration of 
Unemployment, 47 ECONOMETRICA 939 (1979).
105 See Gerard J. van den Berg, Search Behaviour, Transitions to Non-Participation and the 
Duration of Unemployment, 100 ECON. J. 842, 855-56 (1990) (discussing unemployment benefits as a 
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benefits decrease the hazard rate, this means that more benefits 
increase the chance of continued unemployment.
In this same context, a researcher might be interested in whether 
certain characteristics of the unemployed person influence the hazard 
rate, say, whether the person is male or female.  These sorts of 
characteristics are called covariates.  Some covariates change over 
time.  Unsurprisingly, these covariates are called time-varying 
covariates.  In the unemployment context, an example of a time-
varying covariate is underlying economic conditions.  
ii.)  Application to the Choice of Organizational Form 
In our model, the event of interest is the switch from the GP 
form to the LLP form.  Our covariates are the number of lawyers and 
the number of offices in any year and whether the firm is a foreign or 
domestic firm, as we are interested in whether these characteristics 
impact the probability that the firm switches form, given that it had 
not switched form before.  Based on the economic theories discussed 
above in Part II, we would predict that a firm’s number of lawyers 
and number of offices will impact the speed with which the firm 
switches form.  That is, the hazard rate (the probability of switching 
to the LLP form at a specific moment, conditional on the firm not 
switching up to that point) will change with the number of lawyers 
and the number of offices.   Both OFFICES and LAWYERS are 
time-varying covariates in the analysis.  FOREIGN, by contrast, is a 
constant covariate.  
iii.) Results
The starting date of the study is 1994 -- the year that New 
York’s LLP statute became effective.  Although the model is based 
on 110 firms, only 90 firms switched from the GP form to the LLP 
form during the course of the study.106
policy lever).
106
 The model is based on 110, not 118, firms because complete data was unavailable for eight 
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Each firm has multiple observations.  For example, we observe 
the number of lawyers and the number of offices for Kelley Drye & 
Warren LLP in 1994, 1995, and 1996.  We discarded all observations 
after Kelly switched form in 1996, and, in effect, exited the study.
 We used the Cox method for estimating the model.107  For ease 
of interpretation, the estimates on LAWYERS, OFFICES, and 
FOREIGN are reported as hazard ratios.  Hazard ratios have a simple 
interpretation.  If the hazard ratio equals two, this means that a one-
unit increase in the covariate increases the hazard rate by 100%.108
So, for example, if the number of lawyers increases by one and 
the estimated hazard ratio is two, this means that, at any point in 
time, a law firm with 200 lawyers has twice the conditional 
probability of adopting LLP status as a law firm with 199 lawyers.109
If the hazard ratio equals one, a one-unit increase in the covariate of 
inter est has no impact on the hazard rate.  
Table 11 reports the results.  We cannot reject the hypothesis 
that LAWYERS and OFFICES have no effect on the probability of a 
switch in form from a GP to an LLP (i.e. that the hazard ratio for 
each of these variables is equal to one.)   In other words, we cannot 
reject the possibility that, contrary to theory, the number of lawyers 
and the number of offices play no role in a law firm’s decision to 
limit its liability.  This finding provides another check and adds 
robustness to the logit model findings presented above.  
Table 11
firms.     
107
 The Cox model assumes that the “covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard 
function.”  See MARIO A. CLEVES ET AL., supra note __, at 121.  The baseline hazard function is the 
hazard function when all the covariates equal zero.  Id.  The Cox method is a common way to estimate a 
duration model.  We also estimated the effects using various other models, which make different 
assumptions about the distribution of the hazard function.  These models include, for example, the 
exponential and Weibull models.   Id. at 213-250.  Neither LAWYERS nor OFFICES was significant in 
any formulation of the model. 
108
 For a fuller discussion of hazard ratios, see CLEVES ET AL., supra note __, at 122-27.
109
 We also did the same analysis but changed the units on lawyers.  With the changed units, a one-
unit increase meant an increase of ten lawyers at the firm.  Under this modification, we could not reject 
the possibility that the hazard ratio equals one. 
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Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties
No. of subjects = 111                                          Number of obs  =  585
No. of failures =  90
Log likelihood = -371.20846   
Haz. Ratio Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
LAWYERS .9997929       .0007201 -0.29    0.774           .9983825    1.001205    
OFFICES 1.024761        .0359544 0.70    0.486    .95666     1.09771
FOREIGN .6540692      .340994  -0.81   0.415      .235427    1.817152
IV. INTERVIEW DATA
We sought clarification and confirmation of the implications of 
our empirical results through a series of interviews with individuals 
active in and knowledgeable about the choice of organizational form 
by New York law firms.  Specifically, we interviewed:  (1) partners 
at law firms in our sample who had been involved in their firm’s 
decision regarding organizational form; (2) legal consultants, who 
advise law firms on a variety of matters, including the choice of 
organizational form; and (3) insurers, who base malpractice liability 
insurance rates on a variety of factors thought to correlate with the 
probability of a malpractice judgment and, thus, collect data from law 
firms regarding those factors.110
A. Law Firm Partners
1. Methodology
In order to shed light on the results of our empirical analysis, we 
interviewed partners at many of the law firms in our sample.  We 
interviewed partners at many firms across a range of sizes and 
110
 All interview subjects were ensured confidentiality and are not identified by name or firm 
name in this Article.  For purposes of verifiability, redacted interview notes are available from the 
authors.
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practice areas that had opted for LLP status.  More importantly, we 
inter viewed at least one partner at every law firm in our sample that 
had chosen to remain a GP.  To add depth and understanding to our 
analysis, we also interviewed a limited number of in-house counsel 
and partners at law firms that are not in our sample, but that we felt 
were sufficiently similar to our sample of firms to provide useful 
information concerning issues relating to the choice of organizational 
form by firms in our sample.111  In total, we interviewed __ partners 
at __ firms.  [final totals to be added in last round of edits]  
Interviewees were encouraged to freely discuss the choice of 
organizational form at their firm, without prompting or leading from 
the interviewer.  When necessary, interviewees were prompted to 
discuss particular issues of interest to the authors through a list of 
questions.  The list of questions designed for GP partners is attached 
to this article as Appendix E.  The list of questions designed for LLP 
partners is attached to this article as Appendix F.
2. Findings
Although the explanations offered for the choice to remain a GP 
vary across firms and law firm cultures are undoubtedly 
idiosyncratic, several general themes arose from our discussions with 
law firm partners.  First, neither apathy nor lack of attention to the 
costs and benefits of LLP status seem to explain the choice of 
organizational form in any of the firms in our sample.  Second, the 
most frequently-cited issues that arose in connection with the LLP 
debate at most firms were:  concerns over lost collegiality, concerns 
over the perceived negative signal to clients associated with limited 
liability, whether a sufficient number of the filing firm’s peer firms 
had filed, the “Arthur Andersen effect,” and the connection between 
limited liability and lock-step compensation.  In addition, nearly 
every partner that we interviewed indicated a belief that the ultimate 
111
 As an example, one large foreign firm whose main U.S. office is in New York City did not 
appear in our sample due to a quirk in the method by which the firm lists with Martindale-Hubble.  We 
felt that partners at this firm faced issues regarding the choice of organizational form sufficiently similar 
to those faced by firms in our sample to provide useful information.
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movement of law firms to limited liability forms was inevitable.  This 
was true even among partners at firms that had decided to remain a 
GP, at least temporarily.  Third, intra-firm economics had caused a 
handful of firms to struggle with the move to a limited liability entity, 
although each of those firms was eventually able to overcome that 
struggle and file for LLP status.  Finally, some law firm partners 
cited the size, decentralization, and specialization of modern law 
firms as relevant factors motivating the decision to become an LLP.
a. Ruling Out Apathy and Lack of Sophistication
It is worth noting at the outset that neither lack of sophistication, 
failure to appreciate the costs and benefits of limited liability, nor 
simple apathy can explain the lack of movement into LLPs by those 
New York law firms that remain a GP.  As is evident from the many 
large and successful firms listed in Appendix A as a GP, partners at 
the GP firms are quite sophisticated.  Our interview data reveal that, 
in these firms, the partners have debated (and rejected) LLP status.  
The existence of the debate reveals that: (1) partners know about LLP 
status, and (2) the LLP is not the preferred choice for every partner.  
At least some partners perceive costs as well as benefits to the LLP 
form.
This is not to imply that the conversion to a limited liability 
entity entails no transaction costs for law firms.  Simply garnering 
agreement from, in some cases, hundreds of busy and opinionated 
law firm partners doubtless can be difficult.  However, in almost 
every case the reason for this difficulty stems from the fact that many 
law firm partners perceive real costs to the conversion to an LLP 
form, as discussed throughout this Part IV.
In addition, some firms did attribute their slow movement to the 
LLP form to the fact that limiting liability “simply was not a priority” 
for the firm.112  However, at every firm we spoke to, this view 
changed substantially after the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy, as 
discussed in more detail in Part IV.A.2.e.
112
 Confidential interview with law firm partner (interview notes on file with the authors).
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b. Collegiality
Every partner we interviewed identified fears regarding a loss in 
firm collegiality as an issue that arose in their firms’ debates over 
whether to become an LLP.113  When pressed to describe exactly 
what was meant by a loss of collegiality, it became clear that 
“collegiality” takes on several different meanings.
For some partners, particularly older partners, a loss of 
collegiality resembled a form of nostalgia.  These partners often 
lamented the increasing commercialization of law practice and 
yearned for the days when all partners knew and trusted each other 
and all clients knew and trusted their legal counsel.
At other firms, concerns over lost collegiality took on a 
decidedly economic cast.  A commonly-asserted fear was that 
partners would hesitate to advise fellow partners or pitch in on 
matters if doing so would create additional liability risk.  A handful 
of partners at firms that had become LLPs believed that this fear had 
been well-founded at their firm and that certain partners now avoided 
helping out on other partners’ projects, out of a desire to limit their 
personal exposure.114  Most partners, however, indicated that 
becoming an LLP had not impacted in any way the relations among 
partners.  As stated by one law firm partner, “partners who were 
uncollegial before [the firm became an LLP] are still uncollegial and 
partners who were collegial before are still just as collegial [after the 
firm became an LLP].”115
c. Signaling
113
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors); See 
also Lin, supra note __  (quoting an unnamed partner at a major New York law firm as stating that his 
firm deadlocked over the decision of whether to become an LLP because of the “tremendous fear that 
the partnership would lose its collegiality.”)
114
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors).
115
 Confidential interview with law firm partner (interview notes on file with the authors).
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Our interviews with law firm partners revealed that, at nearly 
every firm, partners feared the negative signal that any limitation on 
personal liability might send to their clients and competitors.  This 
fact was particularly true when very few of the firm’s competitor 
firms had opted to limit their liability.  As stated by one law firm 
partner, “At the time we first debated becoming an LLP, none of the 
firms that we consider similar to us had limited their liability.  We 
didn’t want to be path breakers on this.”116
At the same time, as more firms within a given cohort opt for 
LLP status, the perceived negative signal associated with limited 
liability diminishes, and the arguments in favor of limited liability are 
more persuasive.  As stated by one partner, “We’re currently 
reconsidering the issue and my prediction is that we’ll switch [to an 
LLP] at some point in the near future.  Now that most of the other 
firms like us have switched, the arguments against it seem 
weaker.”117
Interestingly, it is not at all clear that this fear is well-founded.  
Every LLP partner that we spoke to believed that the firm’s relations 
with clients had not been altered by the decision to become an LLP.
d.  The Importance of Cohorts
Our interview data reveal that law firms are extraordinarily 
conservative and are reluctant to take actions that may distinguish 
them in a negative manner from their competitor firms.  This fact is 
especially true of the large, elite law firms that we interviewed.  For 
those firms who were slow to file for LLP status (as noted, this is true 
of the majority of elite firms), one of the most commonly-cited 
rationales for the firm’s hesitation in filing was the fact that the firm 
did not want to file until a sufficient number of peer firms had also 
decided to file.118  Similarly, in addition to the Arthur Andersen 
effect, the most commonly-cited motivation behind the eventual 
116
 Confidential interview with law firm partner (interview notes on file with the authors).
117
 Confidential interview with law firm partner (interview notes on file with author).
118
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
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decision to file was the fact that a sufficient number of peer firms had 
finally determined to file.  Our interview data also reveal that law 
firm partners were in regular communication with peer firms about 
the deci sion to file and, in some cases, coordinated the timing of their 
filings.119
e. The Arthur Andersen Effect
In our interviews with partners at firms that had recently chosen 
to limit their liability or were currently considering whether to do so, 
one factor was mentioned repeatedly as being relevant to the firm’s 
decision: the demise of Arthur Andersen.120  This fact was especially 
true at large, elite law firms, many of whom only opted for LLP 
status after 2001.  Apparently, for many of these firms, the threat of a 
liability judgment that exceeded the firm’s malpractice insurance 
seemed relatively remote.121  Given the perceived losses associated 
with limited liability, many firms simply felt that the benefits of LLP 
status were insufficient to overcome the costs.122  For many firms, 
however, this perception changed with the trial and subsequent 
bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen.  Suddenly, the possibility of a 
liability judgment that would not only exhaust the firm’s liability 
insurance, but its partners’ personal assets as well, seemed very real.  
Apparently, the fact that a firm as large and reputable as Arthur 
Andersen could simply disintegrate was a sobering experience for 
many law firm partners, and one that changed their outlook on 
limited liability.  In fact, several partners asserted their belief that 
119
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
120
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with author); see also
Lin, supra note __  (noting that, “[i]n light of the potentially crippling liability faced by Arthur 
Andersen, Vinson & Elkins, and Kirkland & Ellis for their roles in the collapse of Enron Corp., major 
law firms are considering again whether to form themselves into limited liability partnerships.”)
121
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors).  See 
also Lin, supra note __ (quoting Ward Bower, a principal at the law firm consultancy Altman Weil, as 
saying that, prior to Enron, many law firms assumed that malpractice was an insurable risk, but that 
“you can’t insure againt 10-figure liability.”)
122
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
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their firms never would have switched to an LLP had the Enron and 
Arthur Andersen debacles not occurred.123
f. Ruling out the Monitoring Theory
Many, if not most, of the law firm partners with whom we spoke 
were familiar with the theory that placing each partner’s personal 
liability at stake for the blunders of every partner induces more 
careful monitoring among partners.  However, law firm partners with 
whom we spoke tended to scoff at this theory of partnership form.  
First, most partners cited the size, decentralization, and specialization 
of the modern law firm as a factor that prevented the effectiveness of 
such attempts to monitor.124  In addition, many partners were 
offended by the notion that partners fail to attempt such monitoring 
to the best of their ability absent the threat of full personal liability.125
As noted by most partners, the fear of a liability judgment so large 
that it wipes out the partnership’s assets and insurance is not the 
factor that motivates careful legal work and monitoring of fellow 
partners and associates.  Instead, it is concern with maintaining the 
firm’s reputation and maximizing the firm’s billable rates that 
motivates monitoring of partners by other partners.126
g. The Partnership Penalty
Despite the ongoing debate within many law firms regarding the 
choice of organizational form, the interview data reveal a feeling 
among many law firm partners that those partners pushing to remain 
a GP may some day lose the intra-firm debate.  At that time, the 
remaining GP firms—like most of their competitors—will opt for a 
limited liability form of some sort.
123
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
124
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors); see 
also infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing size, decentralization, and specialization as 
impacting the choice of organizational form).
125
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
126
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
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These statements, combined with the other interview data 
discussed in this Part IV, cause us to conclude in Part V.A. of this 
article that, if the GP form continues to exist, it will not be as an 
organizational form voluntarily chosen by firm participants after 
weighing the costs and benefits.  Instead, we predict that the only 
function of the GP form in the coming years will be as a penalty 
default rule that forces parties contemplating the formation of a 
business or professional enterprise to reveal relevant information to 
courts and interested third parties.  At the same time, however, the 
fact that many law firm partners have aggressively pushed to remain 
a GP indicates that, at least for many law firm partners, the benefits 
of unlimited liability are real, a phenomenon explored in subparts b-d 
of this section.
h. The Lock-Step Connection
The decision to switch from a GP to an LLP seemed particularly
difficult at firms that still practiced some version of lock-step 
compensation.  As noted both by partners at lock-step firms and by 
those that are not, the concept of differentiated personal liability is 
inconsistent with the foundational principal at a lock-step firm that all 
of the partners “sink or swim together.”127  In addition, because 
partners at a lock-step firm can only succeed if every other partner 
succeeds, a willingness to pitch in and help out partners on any 
project on which help is needed is especially valued.128
i. Intra-Firm Economics
Our interviews revealed that intra-firm economics had caused a 
handful of the law firms in our sample to struggle with the move to a 
limited liability vehicle, although in every case the firm was 
eventually able to overcome those issues and adopt the LLP form.  
127
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
128
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors); see 
also supra note __ and accompanying text (discussing firm collegiality).
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According to some partners we interviewed, problems with 
renegotiating the division of profits within the firm before moving to 
a limited liability entity caused negotiations over the move to LLP 
status to stall.129
Although LLP law permits partners to use their old GP 
agreement without modification to govern their relationship once 
they become an LLP, at least some firms feel that modification is 
necessary.  This is because the GP form requires partners to share all 
profits and all liability risks, despite the fact that some partners are in 
high-risk, high-return practice areas.  Presumably, GP agreements are 
premised on the notion that such high-risk, high return partners are 
willing to give up some portion of those returns, in exchange for the 
opportunity to share the risk of personal liability with all firm 
partners.
Once a firm adopts limited liability status, however, partners are 
no longer sharing the risk of personal liability for the acts of fellow 
partners.  As such, some high-risk, high-return partners expect to 
receive a greater share of the division of firm profits if the firm 
becomes an LLP.  Debates over whether and how much more some 
partners would receive under an LLP form and how much other 
partners would, in turn, be forced to give up caused some law firms 
to struggle with the move to LLP form, in some cases for as long as a 
year or two.130
j. Size, Specialization, and Decentralization
Although neither the number of lawyers variable nor the number 
of offices variable were significant predictors of the choice of 
129
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
130
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with author); see also
Anthony Lin, After Enron, Firms Rethink Partnership, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at 1 (quoting Kenneth J. 
Laverriere, a Sherman & Sterling partner involved in the organizational form decision, as stating that 
Sherman’s negotiations over the move to LLP status took several months or longer, in part because of 
concerns over the division of profits under the LLP structure when some partners were in high-risk, 
high-return practice areas.)
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 57
57
organizational form in our logit regression,131 law firm partners 
frequently cite the increasing size, decentralization, and 
specialization of the modern law firm as a factor impacting the 
choice to limit the partners’ personal liability.132  To many partners, 
the notion that a trust and estate partner in Texas could or would 
more carefully monitor a bankruptcy partner in New York simply 
because of personal liability fears is absurd, given the realities of 
modern law firm life.133
k. Summary
As noted by law firm partners, no single factor is a determinant 
of the choice of organizational form.134  Instead, as stated by many 
partners, a “confluence” of events has dictated the decision.  Those 
events include the number of similarly situated firms that have 
chosen to become LLPs, rising liability fears associated with Arthur 
Andersen, larger transaction sizes, more frequent malpractice awards, 
the failure of malpractice insurance to keep pace with these risks, and 
the intricacies of internal firm economics and culture.135
B. Law Firm Consultants
Law firm consultants work for consultancy firms that advise law 
firms on a variety of matters relating to law firm structure, operation, 
and profitability, including the choice of organizational form.  Our 
interviews with law firm consultants reinforced the information 
gathered through interviews with law firm partners. 
131 See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
132
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). .
133
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors); See 
also 80 ABA J., Sept. 1994, at 54, 56 (quoting Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of the ABA Business Law 
Section Partnership Committee’s Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies, as stating “[w]hen you 
think about it, there is nothing I as a tax lawyer can do that will protect against someone from another 
department within the firm screwing up a water law issue.”)
134
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
135
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors).
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C. Law Firm Insurers
Insurance companies insure business and professional 
enterprises, including law firms, against a variety of risks, including 
the risk of liability arising from legal advice rendered to clients.  In 
determining what rates to charge law firms for such insurance, 
insurance companies consider a variety of factors that are thought to 
correlate with an increased risk of such liability.
If the theories proposed by economists and legal scholars that 
assert that unlimited liability results in the provision of higher-quality 
legal services are true, then insurance companies should charge GPs 
lower premiums than LLPs, in order to reflect the decreased risk of 
liability among GP firms.136  In other words, if unlimited liability 
really causes partners to better monitor each other, then that reduced 
liability risk should be reflected in lower insurance rates.
Our interviews with law firm insurers reveal that insurance 
companies do not consider organizational form in setting liability 
insurance premiums.137  This is supported by our interviews with law 
firm partners.  Although not every partner we interviewed was 
familiar with the firm’s insurance rates, those who were indicated 
that the decision to become an LLP had been made after consultation 
with the firm’s insurance company and had not altered liability 
insurance premiums.138  Accordingly, insurance companies 
apparently do not believe that unlimited liability causes law firms to 
136
 This is in contrast to theories such as signaling, which predict higher profitability but not a 
lower liability risk, and profit-sharing, which predicts higher per-partner profitability, but not a better 
product.
137
 Interviews with insurers (interview notes on file with authors); see also Jett Hanna, Legal 
Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk and 
Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 641, 645 (1998) (stating that, “[o]nly if the insurer 
provides coverage for prior affiliations of the attorney constituents of a limited liability entity will there 
conceivably be a reduced incident of loss as a result of limited liability status”); Robert W. Hillman, The 
Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 409 (1999) (noting that 
“LLP status does not reduce the liability of the partnership itself, which means the need for insurance 
underwriters to insist on implementation of monitoring mechanisms is largely unaffected by conversion 
of a firm from a general partnership into an LLP”).
138
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with authors). 
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render higher quality legal services.  Unless insurance companies 
have erred in their actuarial calculations or have failed to consider the 
possible connection between organizational form and liability risk, 
this fact undermines the economic theories asserting that unlimited 
liability results in a better legal product.
V. CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE NEW YORK LAW 
FIRM MARKET
In today’s litigious age, legal practitioners understandably are 
concerned with the costs associated with liability, including liability 
for legal malpractice.  According to many sources, malpractice 
actions against law firms are increasingly common and judgments are 
becoming larger.139  In addition, malpractice insurance is more 
expensive, covers less, and by all accounts has not kept pace with the 
increased liability risks associated with larger transaction sizes and 
volatile markets.140  This is particularly true in high-risk legal fields, 
such as banking, securities, and other heavily regulated industries.141
As a result, it is not uncommon today to see law firm bankruptcies or 
139
  Johnson, Limited Liability, supra note __, at  85, 87 (Nov. 1995); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal 
Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1674-80 and App. B & D 
(1994) (demonstrating that malpractice claims have sharply increased); Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the 
Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1142 
(1996); ROLAND E. MALLEN AND JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.6 (5th ed. 2000) (noting 
the rise in malpractice suits is proportionally larger than the increase in the number of practicing 
attorneys); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE PROFILE OF 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 1996-1999 (2001) (finding that insurers expect more frequent and severe 
lawsuits against attorneys following economic downturns).
140
 Johnson, supra note ___, at 88; Rita Henley Jensen, For Third Straight Year Malpractice 
Rates Rise Again, NAT’L. L. J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 3; Earl Ainsworth, Malpractice Insurance: A High 
Priced Headache for Lawyers, N.J. LAW., Mar. 10, 2003, at A2; Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice 
Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 41, 41-42 (2003-2004) (citing various factors 
that “have contributed to fewer insurers writing legal malpractice insurance, limited coverage offered by 
those insurers who remain in the market, and dramatic premium increases for those policies that are 
available”); INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION, MANAGING RISK: WHAT LAW FIRMS 
MUST DO TO CONTROL LIABILITY INSURANCE COSTS, (2003), available at 2003 WL 2068161 (stating 
that firms, especially larger firms, are likely to see substantial rises in liability insurance rates); see also
Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors); Confidential 
interviews with law firm insurers (interview notes on file with the authors).
141
 Johnson, supra note __, at 88.
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law firm partners who incur personal liability as a result of 
malpractice judgments or other law firm debts.142
An analysis of the empirical and interview data collected for this 
article, however, indicates that, at least with respect to New York law 
firms, the costs and benefits of limited liability are more complicated 
than either the academics or legal practitioners would like to believe.  
The rapid movement of firms into the LLP structure and the failure of 
the empirical tests in Part III of this article to return the results 
predicted by existing partnership theories cast doubt on arguments 
that the unlimited liability of the GP form provides the unqualified 
benefits asserted by many researchers.  At the same time, the fact that 
a substantial number of large and sophisticated law firms have opted 
to remain a GP despite the availability of a quick, inexpensive, and 
easy alternative undermines the arguments of legal practitioners who 
suggest that the GP form provides no benefits to those considering 
the formation of a business or professional enterprise.
A. The Future of GPs: A Penalty Partnership Theory
Our empirical results indicate that most New York law firms 
have, in fact, abandoned the GP regime and our follow-up interviews 
with law firm partners whose firms are represented in our study 
indicate that the rest may at some point in time follow suit.  The 
asserted reasons for each firm’s choice of organizational form are 
telling and indicate that, for many partners, the perceived benefits of 
unlimited liability are real.  At the same time, however, the 
interviews indicate that this view is changing, and that most of those 
interviewed believe that full movement into the LLP form is 
inevitable.  If this is true, then the New York law firm market has not 
yet reached equilibrium.
Consistent with these views, we predict that, with the advent of 
the LLP form, if the GP form is to continue to exist in the future, it 
will not be as an organizational form voluntarily chosen after 
142
 Coates, supra note __, at 354-55, n.183 (discussing law firm dissolutions); Johnson, supra
note__, at 88–89.
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carefully weighing the costs and benefits.  Instead, we predict that, as 
is the case with the New York law firms in our sample, parties in 
business and professional relationships will abandon the GP form 
altogether, and it will continue to exist primarily as a penalty default 
regime that forces the revelation of information to the state and 
inter ested third parties.  Accordingly, we add a new theory of 
partnership to those already advanced by lawyers and economists: a 
penalty default theory of partnership.
The penalty default theory of partnership arises from the fact 
that the GP is the ultimate default regime for businesses operated by 
more than one person.  If two or more parties run a business for profit 
and do nothing else, the GP default rules apply.143  The case law is 
full of situations where parties entered into a business and 
unintentionally ended up a partnership. 144
We propose that the GP default rules may make sense—and 
may, in fact, be socially desirable—because they penalize parties 
who fail to formalize their arrangements, either by affirmatively 
choosing an organizational form that requires notification to the state, 
or through elaborate contractual drafting.  In the terms familiar to 
contract law scholars, the entire general partnership regime may 
operate as an information-forcing default rule.
The state may desire such information-forcing from business 
and professional service firms for a variety of reasons.  First, by 
forcing parties to file as an LLP, LLC, or corporation, the state 
encourages the parties to acknowledge they are a business
association.  This recognition, then, pushes parties to explicitly 
resolve (or at least think about) many important issues—such as, for 
example, the division of profits—through careful negotiation and 
143 See White Consul. Indust., Inc. v. Waterhouse, 158 F.R.D. 429, 434 n.7 (D. Minn. 1994) 
(stating that, “whether a legally binding partnership has been formed is a question of fact which can be 
inferred from the partners’ actions. We are aware of no requirement that, in order to verify its formation, 
a partnership agreement must be filed with the State[.]”); Uniform Partnership Act (1914) (“U.P.A.”) § 6 
(defining “partnership”); Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (“R.U.P.A.”) §§ 101(4), 202 (defining 
“partnership”).  
144 See Reddington v. Thomas, 45 N.C. App. 236, 262 (1980); Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38 
(Tenn. 1991); Howard Gault & Son v. First Nat’l Bank, 541 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).  On 
the formation of partnerships, see generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN , supra note __ at § 2.05..
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drafting.  And this, in turn, reduces the information gathering burden 
on courts and creditors.  Second, state notification of the existence of 
a for-profit firm enables the state to take certain actions with respect 
to that firm.  For example, the state can more easily tax and regulate 
for-profit firms when it has been alerted to their existence.145
B. Innovation and Diffusion: Status, Networks, and Signaling
In addition, if the New York law firm market has not reached 
equilibrium, this leads to two questions: (1) why has full movement 
into the LLP form been so slow, and (2) why have some firms moved 
relatively quickly, while others have taken their time?  Our interview 
data reveal that law firms will go to great lengths (in this case, risking 
full personal liability) in order to avoid being perceived in a negative 
light relative to firms that they consider competitors for prestige and 
clients.  This finding is consistent with prior research on the 
importance of signaling and status when the quality of output is 
difficult for consumers to judge,146 and with research on herding 
behavior among law firms and other professionals.147  This insight is 
also consistent with prior research on network effects and innovation, 
as (at least for the elite firms) it is only after a sufficient number of 
peer firms have become an LLP that the benefits of limited liability 
are judged to outweigh the perceived costs.148
145 See Ribstein, Corporations, supra note __, at  4.
146
 Price, supra note __, at 25 (stating that law firms decided to match Gunderson’s salary 
increases because to fail to do so would signal that they were not a top tier firm); Candace Jones, 
Signaling Expertise: How Signals Shape Careers in Creative Industries, in CAREER CREATIVITY : 
EXPLORATIONS IN THE REMAKING OF WORK , (Maury A. Peiperl, Michael B. Arthur, & N. Anand, eds., 
2002) 224–25 (discussing the importance of signaling in the movie industry); Joel M. Podolny, A Status-
Based Model of Market Competition, 98(4) AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 829 (1993) (discussing the importance of 
status as a signal of quality).
147 See Price, supra note __, at 5 (noting that professional organizations, especially law firms, 
tend to copy each other); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural 
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1287 (1987) (demonstrating that whether or not an individual adopts 
an innovation is a function of whether or not prominent peers have done so).
148 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporation 
Contracting (Or, “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Robert B. 
Ahdieh, Cueing Transition in Sovereign Debt Contracts: Network Effects, Coordination Games, and 
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This finding also provides insight into two aspects of change and 
innovation that have interested lawyers and social scientists for some 
time, but which have received minimal empirical study: (1) how new 
standards are adopted by particular market actors, and (2) how those 
changes then diffuse throughout the market.149  Our data indicate that 
elite firms adopted the new LLP form far more slowly than did their 
less elite New York counterparts.  Only after an exogenous shock—
the Enron and Arthur Andersen debacles, along with other corporate 
scandals—prompted some “higher bracket” firms to file as LLPs did 
the elite firms feel comfortable making this move.  In addition, our 
interview data reveal the mechanisms by which this diffusion 
occurred.  Not only did firms observe and copy the organizational 
form of their peer group, they explicitly coordinated their actions so 
as to minimize any potential negative signal associated with 
differentiating themselves from their cohort in terms of 
organizational form.150
In short, markets in equilibrium are frequently studied by 
social scientists.  The adoption of the New York LLP statute, 
however, provides a rare opportunity to study a market in flux.  In 
1994, the New York state legislature provided law firms with a viable 
alternative to the organizational form that most firms had been using 
for many years, in some cases, for centuries.  An analysis of how the 
market responded to this change provides valuable insights into the 
mechanisms by which change occurs and spreads across a market.
Focal Points in the Choice of Mandate Versus Contract (working draft on file with the authors, 
forthcoming, Emory L.J. (2004)); Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: The 
Case of Sovereign Bonds (unpublished draft on file with the authors, forthcoming, Emory L. J. (2004)).  
But see Bruce Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 79 (2001) (finding that network externalities—in the form of an established body of 
law—have only a minimal impact on the choice of organizational form) (unpublished draft on file with 
the authors); Michael J. Whincop, An Empirical Analysis of the Standardization of Corporate Charter 
Terms, 23 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 285 (2003) (finding similar evidence with respect to the evolution of 
Australian charter provisions).
149 See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of 
Talk, Little Action?, XLII J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 121 (2004) (lamenting the lack of empirical 
research on the impact of network effects on innovation).
150
 Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file with the authors); see 
also Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19 RAND J. 
ECON. 235 (1988) (studying the function of standards committees in achieving coordination).
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APPENDIX A
FIRM FORM DATE LAWYERS OFFICES GROWTH
Aaronson Rappaport Feinstein & Deutsch, 
LLP
LLP 01/03/95 58 2 6.5
Abelman Frayne & Schwab GP 29 1 4.9
Afridi & Angell LLC LC 07/01/02 30 6
Amster, Rothstein, & Ebenstein LLP 05/19/03 43 1 3.4
Anderson Kill & Olick, PC PC 05/04/73 121 6
Barnes, Richardson & Colburn GP 27 3 -0.1
Barry, McTiernan & Moore GP 30 3 3.3
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann 
LLP
LLP 09/28/95 34 4 13.8
Bivona & Cohen, P.C. PC 01/10/79 37 5
Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Schwartz & 
Nahins, P.C.
PC 11/14/79 45 1
Brauner Baron Rosenzweig & Klein, 
L.L.P.
LLP 12/23/94 28 1 -0.6
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner 
LLP
LLP 05/24/95 220 5 19.2
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP LLP 02/26/03 411 5 6.2
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP LLP 04/29/03 225 3 1.9
Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP LLP 11/14/02 118 3 4.5
Chadbourne & Parke LLP LLP 08/08/95 428 7 4.2
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton GP 798 12 5.7
Clifford Chance US LLP LLP 01/28/98 3500 32 19.9
Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP LLP 12/02/99 31 1 0.8
Condon & Forsyth LLP LLP 05/07/98 51 3 3.8
Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C. PC 01/05/71 38 3
Cooper & Dunham LLP LLP 12/28/94 38 1 3.2
Coudert Brothers LLP LLP 09/05/01 630 25 7.9
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. PC 12/01/72 50 1
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP LLP 03/25/03 499 3 5.6
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP LLP 07/28/99 156 12 3.4
D'Amato & Lynch GP 84 2 0.6
Darby & Darby Professional Corporation PC 12/27/73 73 2
Davidoff, Malito and Hutcher, LLP LLP 12/22/94 42 4 5.6
Davidson, Davidson & Kappel, LLC LLC 04/01/98 26 1
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FIRM FORM DATE LAWYERS OFFICES GROWTH
Davis & Gilbert, LLP LLP 03/10/98 84 1 9.0
Davis Polk & Wardwell GP 624 9 5.6
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP LLP 12/30/03 514 8 6.3
Dewey Ballantine LLP LLP 09/26/97 550 13 5.5
Dreier LLP LLP 10/17/97 28 1 75.5
Eaton & Van Winkle LLP LLP 09/04/02 27 2 6.1
Emmet Marvin & Martin LLP LLP 12/30/94 62 3 1.5
Epstein Becker & Green PC PC 06/23/80 355 12
Esanu Katsky Korins & Siger, LLP LLP 07/18/97 33 1 4.5
Fischbein Badillo Wagner Harding GP 79 3 3.9
Fish & Neave GP 173 3 4.4
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto GP 142 3 7.1
Flemming, Zulack & Williamson, LLP LLP 11/23/94 28 2 2.4
Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, 
L.L.P.
LLP 03/02/95 27 2 2.2
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, 
LLP 
LLP 06/29/04 141 17 19.7
Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, PC PC 09/24/80 41 1
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson 
LLP
LLP 12/23/03 550 5 4.0
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP LLP 04/13/95 47 2 11.1
Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP LLP 09/02/97 52 2 19.3
Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C. PC 04/02/82 49 1
Gianni Origoni Grippo & Partners GP 270 7 9.4
Gibney, Anthony & Flaherty, LLP LLP 11/30/94 34 4 -1.5
Goldberg Weprin & Ustin LLP LLP 11/21/96 27 1 7.3
Goldfarb & Fleece GP 26 1 4.9
Golenbock Eiseman Assor Bell & Peskoe 
LLP
LLP 08/29/03 35 1 9.5
Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow 
LLP
LLP 10/26/94 46 2 3.5
Gordon & Silber, P.C. PC 07/03/79 29 2
Graubard Miller GP 28 1 -3.4
Grubman Indursky Schindler & Goldstein, 
P.C.
PC 10/01/74 30 1
Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman 
& Klestadt LLP
LLP 03/16/95 32 4 4.1
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FIRM FORM DATE LAWYERS OFFICES GROWTH
Hahn & Hessen LLP LLP 05/23/95 48 2 -0.6
Hawkins Delafield & Wood LLP LLP 12/18/03 111 7 1.1
Healy & Baillie, LLP LLP 08/22/96 27 3 4.3
Heidell Pittoni Murphy & Bach LLP LLP 12/15/98 64 2 4.1
Herrick Feinstein LLP LLP 12/27/94 124 3 13.7
Herzfeld & Rubin PC PC 09/29/71 100 6
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP LLP 05/14/96 303 7 2.9
Jacobowitz, Garfinkel & Lesman GP 32 1 9.3
Jones Hirsch Connors & Bull P.C. PC 01/29/97 50 5
Kane Kessler, P.C. PC 02/01/71 32 2
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP LLP 03/14/95 150 5 17.0
Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP LLP 03/14/03 67 5 29.2
Kaye Scholer LLP LLP 12/29/95 400 9 4.1
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP LLP 05/09/96 305 8 0.2
Kenyon & Kenyon GP 198 3 11.4
Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff & Cohen, P.C. PC 10/27/75 26 2
Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf LLP LLP 07/24/96 28 1 -3.1
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP LLP 10/23/98 260 2 9.0
Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP LLP 03/01/95 101 1 4.8
Kurzman Eisenberg Corbin Lever & 
Goodman, LLP
LLP 02/14/95 27 2 13.6
Ladas & Parry LLP 11/21/03 50 5 1.3
Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C. PC 09/18/95 46 3
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP LLP 10/24/94 650 22 1.7
Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer LLP LLP 06/16/99 65 2 -3.7
London Fischer LLP LLP 05/11/99 50 2 30.1
Martin Clearwater & Bell LLP LLP 10/17/02 70 3 4.3
McAloon & Friedman, P.C. PC 10/07/77 37 1
McLaughlin & Stern, LLP LLP 11/15/94 47 2 10.0
Mendes & Mount LLP LLP 12/11/95 160 3 0.1
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP LLP 02/01/99 496 9 4.4
Morgan & Finnegan LLP LLP 12/19/94 98 2 1.6
Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley LLP 09/06/95 80 1
Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein LLP LLP 12/23/94 83 1 7.7
Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason & 
Silberberg, P.C.
PC 09/06/79 38 1
Moses & Singer LLP LLP 05/24/95 65 2 3.8
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Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass GP 73 5 3.2
Newman Fitch Altheim Myers, P.C. PC 06/25/75 41 2
Nicoletti Hornig Campise Sweeney & 
Paige
GP 28 2 28.9
Ohrenstein & Brown LLP LLP 04/27/95 56 3 8.7
Olshan Grundman Frome Rosenzweig & 
Wolosky LLP
LLP 07/10/95 54 2 6.8
Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb & Soffen, LLP LLP 06/08/95 28 2 1.4
Otterbourg Steindler Houston & Rosen PC PC 06/09/70 58 1
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP LLP 12/30/94 181 1 4.2
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison 
LLP
LLP 12/23/02 500 7 4.4
Pavia & Harcourt LLP LLP 07/30/01 34 1 -4.4
Phillips Nizer LLP LLP 05/11/95 78 3 -2.7
Proskauer Rose LLP LLP 01/26/95 600 7 4.1
Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP LLP 03/27/98 125 1 4.3
Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson LLP LLP 12/04/98 29 4 2.8
Quirk and Bakalor, P.C. PC 09/14/71 29 2
Richards Spears Kibbe & Orbe LLP LLP 12/31/02 55 2 14.4
Roberts & Holland LLP LLP 11/09/94 40 2 -0.4
Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene 
Genovese & Gluck P.C.
PC 02/14/72 50 1
Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. PC 06/02/76 36 1
Sabin, Bermant & Gould LLP LLP 12/20/95 36 1 5.4
Salans GP 400 14 21.2
Satterlee Stephens Burke & Burke LLP LLP 12/30/94 58 2 -0.5
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP LLP 08/23/96 300 2 7.2
Seward & Kissel LLP LLP 01/26/99 115 2 3.6
Shearman & Sterling LLP LLP 06/16/03 697 18 7.7
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP LLP 05/23/03 602 6 6.7
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP LLP 05/25/01 1750 21 5.9
Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young 
Yagerman & Tarallo, P.C.
PC 12/09/88 32 1
Snow Becker Krauss P.C. PC 02/21/80 26 1
Sokolow, Dunaud, Mercadier & Carreras 
LLP
LLP 02/03/98 38 4 44.3
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP LLP 01/24/97 345 3 0.2
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 69
69
FIRM FORM DATE LAWYERS OFFICES GROWTH
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP LLP 12/20/02 661 12 10.6
Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & 
Cannavo P.C.
PC 09/23/74 35 3
Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & 
Hirschtritt LLP
LLP 06/13/95 46 2 9.1
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP LLP 09/02/03 191 5 6.7
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP LLP 11/19/96 408 6 4.3
Torys, LLP LLP 11/30/01 280 2 4.0
Wachtel & Masyr, LLP LLP 12/13/94 34 1 1.0
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz  GP 181 1 7.0
Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schlesinger & 
Kuh, LLP
LLP 03/02/95 34 1 -0.3
Watson Farley & Williams GP 220 7 -1.8
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP LLP 12/18/95 1000 17 5.5
Weitz & Luxenberg, PC PC 02/01/91 45 4
White & Case LLP LLP 12/29/97 1700 37 8.1
White, Fleischner & Fino LLP 11/09/00 30 3 2.7
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP LLP 08/29/03 507 8 4.5
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & 
Dicker LLP
LLP 02/26/98 225 19 3.8
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP LLP 12/22/99 100 5 9.1
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz 
LLP
LLP 11/16/94 55 5 3.7
Wollmuth Maher & Deutsch LLP LLP 03/31/98 26 2 40.1
Wormser, Kiely, Galef & Jacobs LLP LLP 02/05/97 36 2 -0.1
Zeichner Ellman & Krause LLP LLP 04/26/99 27 3 -0.6
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Appendix B
FIRM SALARY TIER COLLEGIAL
Amster, Rothstein, & Ebenstein 120,000 no N
Anderson Kill & Olick, PC 115,000 yes C
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 125,000 yes N
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 125,000 no C
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 125,000 no N
Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP 120,000 no C
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 125,000 no N
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 125,000 no C
Clifford Chance US LLP 125,000 yes C
Cooper & Dunham LLP 115,000 yes N
Coudert Brothers LLP 125,000 yes N
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 125,000 no N
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 125,000 yes N
Darby & Darby Professional Corporation 125,000 no N
Davis Polk & Wardwell 125,000 no C
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 125,000 no C
Dewey Ballantine LLP 125,000 no C
Epstein Becker & Green PC N
Fish & Neave 125,000 no N
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto 125,000 no N
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP 95,000 yes C
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 125,000 no C
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP 125,000 no C
Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP 130,000 no N
Hahn & Hessen LLP 110,000 no C
Hawkins Delafield & Wood LLP 100,000 yes C
Herrick Feinstein LLP 130,000 yes N
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 125,000 no N
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP no C 
Kaye Scholer LLP 125,000 no N
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 125,000 no C
Kenyon & Kenyon 125,000 yes N
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 125,000 no C
Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP 125,000 no C
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP 125,000 no N
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Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 125,000 N
Morgan & Finnegan LLP 125,000 no N
Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein LLP N
Moses & Singer LLP 92,000 no
Olshan Grundman Frome Rosenzweig & Wolosky LLP 115,000 no C
Otterbourg Steindler Houston & Rosen PC 115,000 no N
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 125,000 no C
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 125,000 no N
Proskauer Rose LLP 125,000 no N
Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP 110,000 no N
Salans 112,500 yes N
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 125,000 no N
Seward & Kissel LLP 140,000 no N
Shearman & Sterling LLP 125,000 no N
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 125,000 no C
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 140,000 no N
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 125,000 no N
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125,000 no N
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 125,000 no C
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 125,000 yes C
Torys, LLP 125,000 no C
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz  140,000 no C
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 125,000 no C
White & Case LLP 125,000 yes N
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 125,000 no C
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP N
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Appendix C
FIRM FORTUNE IN-HOUSE 
TOTAL
IN-HOUSE AVERAGE
Amster, Rothstein, & Ebenstein 1 34 34
Anderson Kill & Olick, PC 1 120 120
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1 50 50
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 5 745 149
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2 396 198
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1 76 76
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 6 1512 252
Clifford Chance US LLP 9 1884 209.3333333
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. 3 457 152.3333333
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 9 1886 209.5555556
Davis & Gilbert, LLP 1 27 27
Davis Polk & Wardwell 16 1677 104.8125
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 7 843 120.4285714
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2 208 104
Epstein Becker & Green PC 5 713 142.6
Fish & Neave 6 1383 230.5
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto 3 337 112.3333333
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP 1 154 154
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 6 761 126.8333333
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP 1 73 73
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 3 357 119
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP 1 11 11
Kaye Scholer LLP 3 417 139
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1 89 89
Kenyon & Kenyon 1 246 246
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2 1050 525
Ladas & Parry 6 1598 266.3333333
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP 7 1616 230.8571429
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2 1050 525
Morgan & Finnegan LLP 1 174 174
Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein LLP 1 17 17
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2 320 160
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 7 2143 306.1428571
Proskauer Rose LLP 7 2084 297.7142857
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FIRM FORTUNE IN-HOUSE 
TOTAL
IN-HOUSE AVERAGE
Shearman & Sterling LLP 6 2632 438.6666667
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 14 2047 146.2142857
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 32 4337 135.53125
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 4 331 82.75
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 7 1606 229.4285714
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 6 172 28.66666667
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz 13 1562 120.1538462
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 7 2380 340
White & Case LLP 3 335 111.6666667
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Appendix D
FIRM YEAR PROFITS
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1993
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1994
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1995
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1996
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1997
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1998
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 1999
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2000
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2001
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2002 530000
Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner LLP 2003 565000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1993 505000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1994 425000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1995 565000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1996 645000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1997 785000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1998 820000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 1999 935000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2000 1040000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2001 1105000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2002 1250000
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP 2003 1610000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1993 1210000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1994 1200000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1995 1250000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1996 1400000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1997 1445000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1998 1600000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 1999 1710000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2000 1610000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2001 1805000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2002 1845000
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP 2003 2405000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1993 525000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1994 515000
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FIRM YEAR PROFITS
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1995 545000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1996 610000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1997 535000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1998 615000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 1999 815000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2000 940000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2001 980000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2002 1000000
Chadbourne & Parke LLP 2003 1010000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1993 890000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1994 885000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1995 910000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1996 975000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1997 1060000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1998 1075000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 1999 1225000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2000 1250000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2001 1325000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2002 1445000
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 2003 1445000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1993 260000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1994 370000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1995 310000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1996 315000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1997 380000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1998 395000
Coudert Brothers LLP 1999 425000
Coudert Brothers LLP 2000 390000
Coudert Brothers LLP 2001 455000
Coudert Brothers LLP 2002 475000
Coudert Brothers LLP 2003 420000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1993 1410000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1994 1225000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1995 1340000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1996 1515000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1997 1790000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1998 2050000
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FIRM YEAR PROFITS
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 1999 2110000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2000 2245000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2001 2135000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2002 1960000
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 2003 2080000
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1993
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1994
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1995
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1996
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1997
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1998 615000
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 1999 655000
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2000 700000
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2001
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2002
Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle LLP 2003
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1993 1020000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1994 940000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1995 975000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1996 1125000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1997 1295000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1998 1530000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 1999 1610000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2000 1740000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2001 1775000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2002 1775000
Davis Polk & Wardwell 2003 1925000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1993 685000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1994 805000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1995 890000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1996 1020000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1997 1105000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1998 1200000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1999 1225000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2000 1225000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2001 1105000
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2002 1085000
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Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 2003 1260000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1993 510000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1994 515000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1995 530000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1996 650000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1997 780000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1998 860000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 1999 950000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2000 1035000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2001 1075000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2002 1125000
Dewey Ballantine LLP 2003 1150000
Fish & Neave 1993
Fish & Neave 1994
Fish & Neave 1995
Fish & Neave 1996
Fish & Neave 1997
Fish & Neave 1998 740000
Fish & Neave 1999 700000
Fish & Neave 2000 675000
Fish & Neave 2001 725000
Fish & Neave 2002 800000
Fish & Neave 2003 730000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1993 400000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1994 400000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1995 495000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1996 615000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1997 580000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1998 760000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 1999 855000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2000 1045000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2001 875000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2002 930000
Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP 2003 980000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1993 300000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1994 325000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1995 335000
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Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1996 350000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1997 400000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1998 420000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 1999 450000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2000 520000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2001 640,000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2002 820000
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 2003 950000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1993 535000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1994 490000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1995 475000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1996 445000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1997 525000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1998 620000
Kaye Scholer LLP 1999 690000
Kaye Scholer LLP 2000 795000
Kaye Scholer LLP 2001 890000
Kaye Scholer LLP 2002 980000
Kaye Scholer LLP 2003 1070000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1993 255000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1994 200000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1995 275000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1996 400000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1997 430000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1998 515000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 1999 575000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2000 840000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2001 625000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2002 810000
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP 2003 790000
Kenyon & Kenyon 1993
Kenyon & Kenyon 1994
Kenyon & Kenyon 1995
Kenyon & Kenyon 1996
Kenyon & Kenyon 1997
Kenyon & Kenyon 1998 550000
Kenyon & Kenyon 1999 500000
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 79
79
FIRM YEAR PROFITS
Kenyon & Kenyon 2000 565000
Kenyon & Kenyon 2001 615,000
Kenyon & Kenyon 2002 770000
Kenyon & Kenyon 2003 685000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1993
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1994
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1995
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1996
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1997
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1998 685000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1999 710000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2000 750000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2001 795000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2002 935000
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 2003 1040000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1993 340000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1994 365000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1995 360000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1996 400000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1997 450000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1998 550000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 1999 620000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2000 645000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2001 705000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2002 855000
LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & Mac Rae LLP 2003 935000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1993 540000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1994 575000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1995 590000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1996 735000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1997 860000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1998 1105000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 1999 1275000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2000 1450000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2001 1600000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2002 1785000
Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP 2003 1820000
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Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1993
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1994
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1995
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1996
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1997
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1998 470000
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 1999 550000
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2000 620000
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2001 600000
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2002 730000
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP 2003 900000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1993 610000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1994 655000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1995 675000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1996 745000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1997 865000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1998 825000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 1999 1050000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2000 1210000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2001 1680000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2002 1740000
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP 2003 1840000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1993 400000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1994 420000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1995 480000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1996 510000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1997 600000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1998 660000
Proskauer Rose LLP 1999 740000
Proskauer Rose LLP 2000 915000
Proskauer Rose LLP 2001 965000
Proskauer Rose LLP 2002 1025000
Proskauer Rose LLP 2003 1080000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1993
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1994
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1995
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1996 610000
No. 1] The Economics of Limited Liability 81
81
FIRM YEAR PROFITS
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1997 670000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1998 725000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 1999 825000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2000 875000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2001 950000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2002 1090000
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP 2003 1540000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1993 590000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1994 625000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1995 595000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1996 815000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1997 920000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1998 1045000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 1999 1135000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2000 1350000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2001 950000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2002 1275000
Shearman & Sterling LLP 2003 1215000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1993 925000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1994 930000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1995 1110000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1996 1155000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1997 1285000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1998 1495000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 1999 1655000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2000 1740000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2001 1690000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2002 1845000
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 2003 1940000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1993 690000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1994 820000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1995 885000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1996 990000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1997 1290000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1998 1380000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 1999 1600000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2000 1600000
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Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2001 1565000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2002 1605000
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP 2003 1600000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1993 490000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1994 495000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1995 485000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1996 500000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1997 560000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1998 595000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 1999 630000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2000 685000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2001 785000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2002 800000
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP 2003 920000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1993 1275000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1994 1185000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1995 1310000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1996 1330000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1997 1450000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1998 1645000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1999 1790000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2000 1715000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2001 1670000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2002 1720000
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 2003 1900000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1993
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1994
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1995
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1996
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1997
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1998 415000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 1999 480000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2000 480000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2001 475000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2002 640000
Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP 2003 810000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1993
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Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1994
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1995
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1996
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1997
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1998 405000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 1999 465000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2000 500000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2001 560000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2002 510000
Thelen Reid & Priest LLP 2003 555000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1993 1350000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1994 1400000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1995 1595000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1996 1390000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1997 2200000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1998 3105000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  1999 3385000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  2000 3285000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  2001 3165000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  2002 2920000
Wachtell Lipton  Rosen & Katz  2003 2585000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1993 745000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1994 700000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1995 705000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1996 735000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1997 805000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1998 890000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 1999 980000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2000 1025000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2001 1130000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2002 1300000
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 2003 1505000
White & Case LLP 1993 530000
White & Case LLP 1994 555000
White & Case LLP 1995 565000
White & Case LLP 1996 565000
White & Case LLP 1997 625000
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White & Case LLP 1998 665000
White & Case LLP 1999 725000
White & Case LLP 2000 775000
White & Case LLP 2001 865000
White & Case LLP 2002 935000
White & Case LLP 2003 1010000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1993 720000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1994 740000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1995 760000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1996 915000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1997 900000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1998 955000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1999 1100000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2000 1015000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2001 1170000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2002 1295000
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 2003 1410000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1993 405000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1994 275000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1995 320000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1996 330000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1997 305000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1998 290000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 1999 270000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2000 270000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2001 370000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2002 605000
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP 2003 690000
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Appendix E -- Questions for GP partners
1. Has your firm discussed becoming an LLP?
2. What were the reasons asserted in favor of remaining a GP?
3. What were the reasons (other than limited liability) asserted in favor of LLP?
4. Was there an age division?
a. I.e. did older partners favor the status quo more than younger ones?
5. Do you think that you’ll eventually move to become an LLP?
6. Was there any talk of redoing the partnership agreement to reflect higher profits for high-
risk/high-return partners if you moved to LLP?
7.    Does your firm have a lock-step partner compensation structure?
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Appendix F -- Questions for LLP Partners
1.  Your firm didn’t take advantage of the LLP statute right away.  In fact it took you ___ 
years to make the LLP filing.  What took so long?
OR
Unlike many New York firms, your firm opted to become an LLP fairly quickly after the 
statute became effective.  Why was the choice so easy for you?  Why do you think other 
firms struggled with the decision and your firm did not?
2. What were the primary arguments made against the LLP filing?
a. Monitoring?
b. Collegiality?
c. Signaling?
d. Intra-firm economics?
e. Were there age differences in these arguments?  i.e. did older partners favor the 
traditional GP structure more than younger partners did?
3. What were the factors that caused the arguments in favor of LLP to finally win out?
4.  Has your firm had any regrets about the choice to become an LLP?  
a. Has it altered your practice or relations with clients in any way?  
b. Has it altered relations among the partners in any way?
c. Has it altered relations with your insurance company in any way?
5.  IF APPLICABLE – I notice that you filed at the same time as _____ [similar firms].  
Was that a conscious decision?  Did their decision to file affect your decision in any way?
6.  Does your firm have a lock-step partnership structure?
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Chart 2
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